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DID NEPA DROWN NEW ORLEANS?
THE LEVEES, THE BLAME GAME, AND
THE HAZARDS OF HINDSIGHT
DOUGLAS A. KYSAR†
THOMAS O. MCGARITY††
ABSTRACT
This Article highlights the hazards of hindsight analysis of the
causes of catastrophic events, focusing on theories of why the New
Orleans levees failed during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and
particularly on the theory that the levee failures were “caused” by a
1977 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) lawsuit that
resulted in a temporary injunction against the Army Corps of
Engineers’ hurricane protection project for New Orleans. The Article
provides a detailed historical reconstruction of the decision process
that eventuated in the New Orleans storm surge protection system,
focusing both on the political and legal factors involved and on the
“standard project hurricane” risk assessment model that lay at the
heart of the Army Corps of Engineers’ decisionmaking process. The
Article then offers a detailed analysis of how and why Hurricane
Katrina overcame the New Orleans levee system. As this analysis
demonstrates, the argument that the NEPA lawsuit played a
meaningful causal role in the Katrina disaster is not persuasive.
Parallel lessons are then drawn for forward-looking disaster policy.
The same problems of uncertainty and complexity that confound the
attempt through hindsight to attribute causal responsibility for a
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disaster also confound the attempt to predict using foresight the
variety of outcomes, including potentially disastrous ones, that may
flow from policy choices. Focusing narrowly on any single parameter
of complex natural and human systems is likely to dramatically distort
environmental, health, and safety decisionmaking, whether the
parameter is a “standard project hurricane” when planning a
hurricane protection plan, or the equally mythical “lawsuit that sunk
New Orleans” when attempting to allocate responsibility for the
plan’s failure some forty years later.

INTRODUCTION
“[T]here are only two kinds of levees, those that have failed and
1
those that will fail.”

The failure of the New Orleans levees to prevent waters from
Lake Pontchartrain, Lake Borgne, and the Gulf of Mexico from
flooding the city during Hurricane Katrina led to one of the worst
disasters in this country’s history. Although many other causes for the
human suffering and economic loss that followed in the wake of
Katrina have been identified and debated, no one disputes the causal
connection between the flooding and the failure of the levees. Had
the levees been differently designed, constructed, and/or maintained,
the flooding would not have occurred. The critical question of why
the levees failed, however, has generated considerable disagreement.
Although the casual observer might assume that this is primarily a
question for engineering experts, a complete answer may also require
a careful reconstruction of the planning history of the levee system
and of the role that federal budgetary policy, environmental
litigation, and other public policy developments played in the
system’s complex evolution.
In the heated political aftermath of Katrina, the analysis has
been further complicated by the perhaps unavoidable tendency of
participants in public policy debates to conflate causation with fault
and to play the “blame game.” Prominently featured in Katrina’s
immediate political aftermath was the claim that the levee system
would have protected New Orleans had local fishermen and an

1. ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, HURRICANES KATRINA & RITA: USING
MITIGATION TO REBUILD A SAFER GULF COAST 4 (2005), available at http://www.floods.org/
PDF/ASFPM_HurricaneKatrina_WhitePaper_090905.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2006) (reporting a
saying common among U.S. Army Corps of Engineers staff).
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environmental group not filed a lawsuit in the late 1970s under the
2
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). In particular, critics
argue that because a federal district court responded to this suit by
enjoining the levee project pending the preparation of an adequate
environmental impact statement (EIS), the United States Army
Corps of Engineers ultimately abandoned its original design for the
New Orleans levees and adopted instead an alternative design that is
said to have been less capable of protecting the city from the storm
surge created by Katrina. In other words, some commentators
contend that, as a result of the lawsuit, the Corps redesigned the
project in a way that failed to protect the city.
This Article evaluates the claim that the 1970s environmental
lawsuit caused—in any meaningful sense—the destruction of New
Orleans in 2005. Although correct answers to many engineering
questions are critical to this analysis, the Article does not attempt to
resolve those technical questions. It relies instead on preliminary
reports produced by various groups of engineers that have analyzed
the failures of particular levees. The Article also avoids, to the extent
possible, other sociopolitical explanations for the levee failures that
were featured in the post-Katrina blame game, such as the failure of
the George W. Bush Administration and its predecessors to request
sufficient appropriations to build and maintain levees and the role
played by alleged mismanagement within the special New Orleans
levee districts.3 Focusing exclusively on the environmental lawsuit
claim, this Article attempts to probe at a deeper level the difficulty of
retrospective analysis, in the hope that the discussion might prove
helpful in the examination not only of the levee failures, but also of
those other potentially contributing causes. Just as the “lawsuit that
drowned New Orleans” turns out to be oversimplified and
misleading, other attempts to pin responsibility for the Katrina levee
failure on any single act or omission are likely to obscure the broader
lessons of the tragedy.
In that respect, scrutinizing the role of the NEPA lawsuit in the
Katrina levee failures also sheds some important light on the

2. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331–4335, 4341–4347
(2000).
3. See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply and Demand of
Disaster Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101, 113–14 (2006) (observing numerous pre-Katrina
warnings of the inadequacy of the existing storm surge protection system); Andrew Martin &
Andrew Zajac, Flood-Control Funds Short of Requests, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 2005, at 7.
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challenges facing government disaster policy from the forwardlooking perspective. The same problems of uncertainty and
complexity that confound the attempt through hindsight to attribute
causal responsibility for a disaster also confound the attempt to
predict using foresight the variety of outcomes, including potentially
disastrous ones, that may flow from policy choices. Thus, in order to
guard against catastrophic potentialities in the future—whether of
economic, environmental, or human loss—one must keep firmly in
mind not only the hazards of hindsight, but also the foibles of
foresight.
The next Part of this Article provides a detailed historical
reconstruction of the decision process that eventuated in the New
Orleans storm surge protection system, highlighting the relevant
litigation brought against the Corps of Engineers by various local
interests, including the environmental action group Save Our
4
Wetlands. Part I ultimately analyzes how and why Katrina overcame
the storm surge protection system. Part II then uses tort law’s but-for
causation doctrine to introduce the blame game that has been played
post-Katrina by policymakers, politicians, and various others. Part III
considers in depth the counterfactual scenario of a levee planning
process absent the NEPA lawsuit, in order to construct a hindsight
analysis of the likely causal role played by Save Our Wetlands in the
flooding of New Orleans. Lessons about forecasting risk and
appropriately preparing for future calamities are drawn from the
foregoing analysis in Part IV.
I. HISTORY OF THE LEVEE SYSTEM
Because New Orleans is situated in the delta formed at the
mouth of the Mississippi River, it has long maintained a flood control
system to protect it from the risks of flooding from the Mississippi
River to the south, Lake Pontchartrain to the north, and Lake Borgne
5
and the Gulf of Mexico to the east. The levee system that surrounded
New Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina provided by far the most

4. Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Rush, No. 75-3710, slip op. (E.D. La. 1977), http://www.
saveourwetlands.org/77-schwartz.htm.
5. R.B. SEED ET AL., CTR. FOR INFO. TECH. RESEARCH IN THE INTEREST OF SOC’Y,
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NEW ORLEANS LEVEE SYSTEMS IN
HURRICANE KATRINA ON AUG. 29, 2005, at 1-2 (2005), http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/~new_
orleans/report/PRELIM.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2006); Mark Fischetti, Drowning New
Orleans, SCI. AM., Oct. 1, 2001, at 76, 78.
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sophisticated and powerful protection in the city’s long history.
Katrina demonstrated, however, that an even more sophisticated and
powerful flooding and storm surge protection system will be needed
to protect the city in the future. In particular, because of its unique
topographical setting, the city of New Orleans will always be at risk
from a catastrophic failure of the levee systems that have grown up
around it, if levees are to remain the city’s primary form of defense.
Indeed, the risk will only increase as the city continues to subside and
the protective wetlands between it and the Gulf of Mexico continue
6
to diminish.
In addition to its Gulf storm surge protection projects, the Corps
of Engineers also designed and constructed the levee system that
protects New Orleans from the periodic Mississippi River flooding
that typically occurs during springtime. The risk of flooding from the
Mississippi River stems largely from flood waters moving down the
river as a result of rainfall events that may take place hundreds of
miles to the north of the city. The primary line of defense against
river flooding is an extensive system of levees and dikes that extends
along the length of the river as it flows through Louisiana. That
system, which contains the city’s highest levees, averaging 25 feet
above sea level in height, was not involved in the Hurricane Katrina
7
disaster. Although one misinformed participant in the blame game
following the Katrina disaster erroneously attributed the New
Orleans flooding to an environmental lawsuit involving the
Mississippi River levees (200 miles upstream, no less),8 most of the
critical attention to environmental litigation in the wake of Katrina
has focused instead on the levee system that protects New Orleans
from sea storm surge. Unlike the Mississippi River flood protection
system, those levees did not perform during Katrina as they were
designed to do. Accordingly, the discussion hereafter will focus
exclusively on those levees, rather than the Mississippi River flood
protection system.
Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne are located side-by-side to
the north and northeast of the city and are separated by a narrow

6. Fischetti, supra note 5, at 78.
7. Bob Marshall, Levee System Along River Held Its Ground in Storm, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Jan. 23, 2006, at A1.
8. R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr., Commentary, Eco-Catastrophe Echoes, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 16,
2005, at A19, available at http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20050915-090259-2463r.htm
(last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
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strip of land that allows water to flow between the lakes through two
narrow passes northeast of the city at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur
9
(see Figure 1). Although Lake Borgne is separated from developed
areas of the city by a large area of open swampland, Lake
Pontchartrain immediately borders the downtown and western parts
of the city.10 The primary flood risk from the lakes occurs in the late
summer and fall during tropical storms and hurricanes. Surges in
Lake Pontchartrain pose the greatest risk to the downtown area, and
surges in Lake Borgne primarily threaten New Orleans East and St.
Bernard Parish to the east of the downtown area. An interconnected
series of levees protects the city from storm surges in the lakes. These
levees are considerably smaller than the ones that line the Mississippi
River, ranging from 13.5 to 18 feet above sea level in height.
Figure 1. New Orleans Hurricane Protection with Hurricane Katrina
Breaches and Flooding

9. A map of the lakes and levees prepared by the Times-Picayune staff can be found
online. Last Line of Defense: Hoping the Levees Hold, TIMES-PICAYUNE, http://www.nola.com/
hurricane/popup/nolalevees_jpg.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Last Line of
Defense].
10. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-2.
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Because much of the land mass of New Orleans is below sea level
and continues to sink, rainwater that flows into the city must be
removed not by natural drainage, but by huge pumps that force the
water to move northward along three man-made canals, called
“outfall” or “drainage” canals, into Lake Pontchartrain. Named for
the streets that they parallel (17th Street, London Avenue, and
Orleans Avenue), the canals are lined with levees and concrete
floodwalls that prevent the water from spilling into the city.11 In some
places, water flowing through the canals is nearly as high as the
12
rooftops of houses in the surrounding neighborhoods. All of these
levees were built by contractors working for the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and, like all of the levees protecting the city, are
13
maintained by various local levee districts.
In addition to the drainage canals, the Corps of Engineers during
the twentieth century constructed three large and interconnected
“navigation” canals to permit oceangoing vessels to move from the
Mississippi River through the city north to Lake Pontchartrain,
northeast to the Intercoastal Waterway that connects ports along the
entire Gulf Coast, and south to the Gulf of Mexico. The Inner Harbor
Navigation Canal (often referred to by the local population as the
“Industrial Canal”) slices north–south across the city between the
river and Lake Pontchartrain at the point where they are closest to
each other. The Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MRGO) canal bisects
the Industrial Canal at right angles and travels east–west to a point in
St. Bernard Parish where it forms a “Y” with the Intercoastal
Waterway. From the Y, the Intercoastal Waterway moves to the
northeast and the MRGO Canal continues in a southeasterly
direction to the Gulf of Mexico.14 Like the outfall canals, the shipping
canals are all confined by earthen levees and concrete floodwalls.
The levee systems effectively divide the city and surrounding
developed areas into four large protected basins called “polders,”
each of which is protected by its own perimeter levee system.15 Thus,
the land within one polder can flood while the land remaining within
other polders remains protected. In the devastating Katrina flood,

11. Id. at 2-1.
12. Last Line of Defense, supra note 9.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. R.B. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-3. The word “polder” is a Dutch word that means
“a contiguous land unit protected by a perimeter levee system.” Id. at 1-2.
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however, levees in all of the polders failed, and some or all of the land
within each was flooded. Land located in the crescent bordering the
Mississippi River at the south end of the downtown area is above sea
level and therefore was not flooded.
A. Levee Planning and Construction History
The system just described grew out of a reevaluation of the
protections that had failed when Hurricane Betsy struck New Orleans
in September 1965. Reacting to the devastating flooding which
resulted from that storm, Congress authorized a massive hurricane
protection improvement effort called the Lake Pontchartrain and
Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (LPVHPP) to provide
hurricane protection to all of the Greater New Orleans metropolitan
area.16 To implement this statute, the Corps of Engineers carefully
studied two major options—the “high level” option and the “barrier”
option.
1. The “High Level” and “Barrier” Options. The “high level”
option consisted simply of raising all of the existing levees and, where
necessary, constructing new levees to a height that would prevent
flooding that could result from the standard project hurricane (SPH),
a hypothetical hurricane that was used to guide Corps levee design
and that loosely represented the most extreme hurricane that would
be expected to hit New Orleans every 200 to 300 years.17 Although
experts later determined that the model hurricane could not possibly
occur in the real world,18 it was roughly equivalent to a fast-moving

16. Hurricane Protection Plan for Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Water Resources, 95th Cong. 20 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 House Hearings]
(testimony of Colonel Early J. Rush III, District Engineer, U.S. Army Engineer District, New
Orleans); see also U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HURRICANE PROTECTION:
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEVEE MAINTENANCE AND EMERGENCY
RESPONSE FOR THE LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN PROJECT: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE S. COMM. ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 4 (2005) [hereinafter GAO REPORT,
HURRICANE PROTECTION].
17. 1978 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 21 (testimony of Colonel Early J. Rush III,
District Engineer, U.S. Army Engineer District, New Orleans). For an extended discussion of
the SPH, see infra Part IV.A.
18. John McQuaid & Mark Schleifstein, Evolving Danger: Experts Know We Face a
Greater Threat from Hurricanes than Previously Suspected, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 23, 2002, at
J12 (“Meteorologists today say the Standard Project Hurricane could not exist in nature.”).
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19
Category Three storm on the Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale. In
practice, the high level plan for protection against the SPH would
have resulted in raising the levees from between 9.3 and 13.5 feet
20
above sea level to between 16 and 18.5 feet above sea level. The
assumption was, of course, that the levees would be properly designed
and constructed to withstand all storm surges that did not exceed
those levels.
Under the “barrier” option, the Corps would have constructed
levees along the far eastern edge of Lake Pontchartrain, where it
flows into Lake Borgne and ultimately the Gulf of Mexico through
two relatively narrow channels at the Rigolets pass and Chef Menteur
pass (see Figure 2). The Corps would also have constructed structures
at the two passes containing massive gates that would have allowed
water to flow back and forth between the lakes, but that would have
21
been closed when hurricanes approached. Finally, the Corps would
have built a navigation lock, rock dike, and gated flood control
structure at the point at which the Industrial Canal enters Lake
Pontchartrain. The gates would have been closed during hurricanes to
prevent water from entering the Industrial Canal from Lake
Pontchartrain.22 The Corps believed that the levees and the barrier
structure would prevent the storm surges that precede hurricanes
23
from crossing from Lake Bourne into Lake Pontchartrain.
Consequently, the levees bordering the city along Lake Pontchartrain
would be fortified, but not significantly raised as under the alternative
plan. Still, like the high level option, the barrier option was designed
to protect against the SPH.24

2. First Choice: The Barrier Option. The high level option had
several drawbacks from the perspective of Corps officials, including
the need to obtain rights-of-way for additional land near the levees to

19. Id.; Jerry Mitchell, E-Mail Suggests Government Seeking to Blame Groups, MISS.
CLARION-LEDGER, Sept. 16, 2005, at A1; see GAO REPORT, HURRICANE PROTECTION, supra
note 16, at 1.
20. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COST, SCHEDULE, AND PERFORMANCE PROBLEMS
OF THE LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN AND VICINITY, LOUISIANA, HURRICANE PROTECTION
PROJECT 3 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 GAO REPORT].
21. 1978 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 22–24, 33–36 (testimony of Colonel Early J.
Rush III, District Engineer, U.S. Army Engineer District, New Orleans).
22. Id. at 22.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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allow them to be widened and raised. In addition, the high level plan
would not have prevented the flooding of some industrial areas and
potentially developable wetlands located outside the existing
downtown polder between the levees and the lake to the northeast of
25
the city. The Corps therefore decided to implement the barrier
26
option. To speed the project along, the Orleans Levee Board
financed and constructed portions of the Industrial Canal floodwalls,
and this relatively inexpensive aspect of the project was virtually
completed by 1973.27 Work on the barrier structures and levees
running from New Orleans to the those structures, however, was
greatly delayed because the local interests who were responsible for
obtaining the rights-of-way that the Corps needed to construct the
28
levees did not always agree with the Corps’ construction priorities.
In 1976, a coalition of local fishermen and an environmental
group called Save Our Wetlands sued the Corps of Engineers,
alleging that the final environmental impact statement (FEIS)
29
prepared for the project was inadequate. On December 30, 1977, a
federal district court agreed, issuing an injunction that prevented the
Corps from conducting any further work on the barrier project until it
had prepared an adequate FEIS. The injunction was subsequently
modified to permit continued construction of the levees between the
lake and the city of New Orleans.30

25.
26.

Id. at 21.
DONALD T. HORNSTEIN ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, BROKEN LEVEES:
WHY THEY FAILED 4 (2005), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/CPR_Special_Levee_
Report.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
27. Id.
28. 1976 GAO Report, supra note 20, at 16.
29. HORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 5.
30. Id.
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Figure 2. Rejected Inlet Barriers and Canal Floodgates

3. Second Choice: The High Level Plan. After the injunction
issued, the Corps reconsidered the costs and benefits of the barrier
and high level options. It was at that time encountering additional
opposition from local interests who were responsble for obtaining
rights-of-way31 and citizens who saw the project as “a land grab that
would personally enrich some of the civic leaders pushing hardest for
32
it.” Additional opposition arose from representatives of areas on the
Lake Borgne side of the barrier who likely would have been placed at
greater risk of flooding during hurricanes, and who therefore felt the
33
plan would foreclose economic development of their region.
The intense public opposition was in evidence during
congressional hearings conducted in New Orleans the week after the

31.
32.
33.

1976 GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 3.
Carl M. Cannon, The Next Big One, NAT’L J., Sept. 24, 2005, at 2902, 2907.
Id.
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injunction issued. A spokesperson for the League of Women Voters
argued that the Corps had never undertaken a study of the cost to
taxpayers of maintaining the urbanization of wetlands that the project
envisioned. She noted that the voters of New Orleans had defeated
proposals to participate in financing the barrier project on three
separate occasions, but had voted to approve a similar project without
34
the barriers the previous year. An informal poll conducted by
Representative Robert Livingston indicated that a substantial
majority of the New Orleans citizens either opposed the project (38.5
percent) or favored discontinuation until the studies could be
completed (23.6 percent).35 Although not known for his antipathy to
federally financed public works projects in his district, even
Representative Livingston expressed considerable reservations about
the wisdom of this particular project. The state representative from
St. Tammany Parish, part of which was on the Lake Borgne side of
the barrier project, warned that the project would put his parish at
risk when the gates were closed because it would deflect the surge
from Lake Borgne into St. Tammany Parish.36
By 1982, the New Orleans District of the Corps of Engineers had
changed its mind. It now favored the high level plan “because it
would cost less than the barrier plan” and would “have fewer
detrimental effects on Lake Pontchartrain’s environment.”37
Undoubtedly, one of the factors underlying the changed cost
assessment was the delay in obtaining rights-of-way from local
interests who disagreed with the Corps’ construction priorities.38 The
Corps made a final decision to proceed with the high level plan in
1985. Although nearly seven years had passed between the issuance
of the injunction and the Corps’ ultimate decision to abandon the
barrier plan, the project was substantially completed prior to
Hurricane Katrina.39

34.
35.
36.
37.

1978 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 11 (testimony of Charlotte H. Nelson).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 47–48 (testimony of Edward G. Scogin).
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVED PLANNING NEEDED BY THE CORPS OF
ENGINEERS TO RESOLVE ENVIRONMENTAL, TECHNICAL, AND FINANCIAL ISSUES ON THE
LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN HURRICANE PROTECTION PROJECT app. I. at 2 (1982) [hereinafter
1982 GAO REPORT].
38. 1976 GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 16.
39. HORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 6.
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B. The Levee Failures
The explanation for why the New Orleans levees failed involves
a complex interaction of engineering and policy considerations. What
physically happened to the levees on August 29, 2005, however, is
largely a technical question. This is not to say that there is an easy
explanation for what exactly happened to the levees that night, and
the engineers studying that question will no doubt debate the finer
points of the analysis for years. The description that follows draws
primarily upon the preliminary report of a group of experts from the
University of California at Berkeley and the American Society of
Civil Engineers (the Berkeley/ASCE group) based upon its analysis
of the situation shortly after the hurricane.40 The Corps of Engineers,
a group from the Louisiana State University (LSU) Hurricane
Center, and a panel assembled by the National Academy of Sciences
are also conducting in-depth inquiries that could well come to
different conclusions.41
1. Lake Pontchartrain and the Outfall Canals. The water that
flooded the polder containing downtown New Orleans and the
French Quarter did not flow over the high level levees situated
between Lake Pontchartrain and the city. As previously discussed,
these levees were designed to withstand a hurricane that was roughly
equivalent to a fast-moving Category Three Hurricane, and they did
their job. Most of the experts have agreed that by the time it
encountered Lake Pontchartrain, Katrina’s status had decreased from
Category Four to the upper range of Category Three.42 As the surge
flowed from Lake Pontchartrain up the 17th Street, Orleans Avenue,
and London Avenue outfall canals, it did not overtop the levees
confining those canals either.43 The surge did, however, cause three

40. See generally SEED ET AL., supra note 5.
41. John M. Barry, After the Deluge, Some Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005, at A1. For
more current information, Boalt Hall School of Law maintains a website of regularly updated
information on the Katrina disaster, as well as disasters and the law more generally. See
generally Disasters and the Law: Katrina and Beyond, http://128.32.29.133/disasters.php (last
visited Aug. 18, 2006).
42. Joby Warrick & Michael Grunwald, Investigators Link Levee Failures to Design Flaws,
WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2005, at A1.
43. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-5; see also Barry, supra note 41 (citing the preliminary
conclusions of three post-Katrina engineering studies that the storm surge did not top the
levees); Celeste Biever, Flood Walls in New Orleans were “Structurally Flawed,” NEW
SCIENTIST, Sept. 22, 2005, http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn8038 (last visited Oct. 5,
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44
major breaches in the 17th Street and London Avenue levees. These
breaches allowed water from Lake Pontchartrain to flood wide areas
of the downtown polder. In the aftermath of the storm, the Corps of
Engineers stressed that the two specific outfall levees that had
breached were “fully completed” and not on the list of unfunded
projects.45
The Berkeley/ASCE group concluded that the levee failure on
the east side of the 17th Street canal “appears to have been a stability
failure of the foundation soils beneath the earthen embankment” to
which the floodwall was attached.46 The group determined as a
preliminary matter that the breach on the west bank of the London
Avenue canal “occurred as a result of the sheetpile/floodwall being
pushed backwards by the elevated water pressures on the outboard
side, and that support on the inboard side of the sheetpile/floodwall
was reduced as a result of soil failure at or beneath the base of the
earthen levee embankment.”47 According to the group’s report
“[e]vidence at both sites suggests that massive underseepage passed
beneath the relatively short sheetpiles, and this may have weakened
the foundation soils beneath the inboard sides of the earthen levee
embankments.”48 In other words, the pressure that the storm surge
generated from within the canal caused the weak soil in which the
floodwalls were anchored to give way in some places and pushed the
walls backwards into the protected polders.
Consistent with this conclusion, most experts who have examined
the question have concluded that at the time the floodwalls were
designed and built, the floodwalls were not anchored sufficiently
deeply in the foundation soils.49 The leader of the Berkeley/ASCE
group noted that the safety margins employed in the designs for the
levees were far lower than the safety margins employed in most other

2006) (“The way that [the levees] failed was not consistent with overtopping . . . .” (quoting Paul
Kemp, an oceanologist at the Louisiana State University Hurricane Center)).
44. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-5.
45. Martin & Zajac, supra note 3, at 7.
46. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 2-3.
47. Id. at 2-6.
48. Id.
49. Biever, supra note 43; see Eli Kintisch, Levees Came Up Short, Researchers Tell
Congress, 310 SCI. 953, 955 (2005) (showing how the levees, in some areas where they were
breached, were only half as deep as in other areas and descend no deeper than the layer of
peat); Joby Warrick & Spencer S. Hsu, Levees’ Construction Faulted in New Orleans Flood
Inquiry, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2005, at A3 (reviewing testimony of three groups of engineers).
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50
critical engineering projects. The Corps of Engineers has
traditionally employed a safety factor of 1.3 for levee construction
projects, meaning that levees are designed to withstand pressure
51
approximately one-third again as powerful as expected forces.
According to documents from the mid-1980s when the high level
option was being implemented along the outfall canals (accounts of
which vary somewhat), tests of the soil below the existing levees
52
encountered a layer of peat some 15–20 feet below the surface. The
design for the project called for sinking the pilings 17–20 feet below
53
the surface. Because peat expands and softens when it becomes wet,
the pilings should have been extended sufficiently far beneath the
54
peat to provide adequate stability. A team of experts from Louisiana
State University concluded from an examination of historical
documents that the floodwalls built in the 1980s to implement the
high level option were not anchored sufficiently deeply because the
soils immediately below the existing levees consisted of spoil from
digging the canals in the late nineteenth century and dredging them in
the early twentieth century.55 This explanation is consistent with
documents filed in litigation during the mid-1990s between the Corps
of Engineers and a construction company that had been working on
the levees. The company claimed that sections of the floodwalls were
failing to line up properly because of unstable underlying soils.56
Although Corps of Engineers officials are not yet persuaded by this

50. Ralph Vartabedian & Stephen Braun, System Failures Seen in Levees, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
22, 2005, at A1.
51. John McQuaid, Bob Marshall & Mark Schleifstein, Evidence Points to Man-made
Disaster, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 8, 2005, at A1.
52. Christopher Drew & John Schwartz, Engineers Point to Flaws in Flood Walls’ Design as
Probable Cause of Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at A17 (peat located 15 feet below the
surface); Warrick & Grunwald, supra note 42 (peat located 20 feet below the surface).
53. Drew & Schwartz, supra note 52 (pilings sunk 17 feet below the surface); Warrick &
Grunwald, supra note 42 (pilings sunk 20 feet below the surface).
54. Drew & Schwartz, supra note 52 (citing “[s]everal outside engineers”); see Warrick &
Grunwald, supra note 42 (noting an Army Corps of Engineers proposal to rebuild the steel
pilings in the levee system completely through the weak layer of peat).
55. Bob Marshall & Mark Schleifstein, Levee Wall Problems too Obvious, Experts Say,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 28, 2005, at A1.
56. Warrick & Grunwald, supra note 42. According to a spokesperson for the Corps of
Engineers, a number of the documents contained in the 325 boxes of documents that the Corps
has identified as being related to the construction of New Orleans levees may be withheld from
the public because of “homeland security concerns.” Mark Schleifstein, Levee Team Runs into
Wall, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 26, 2005, at 1.
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explanation, the design for rebuilding the floodwalls post-Katrina
57
does call for sinking the pilings to a depth of 40 feet.
Other evidence suggests that the contractors who were
responsible for testing the soil and building the levees along the
outfall canals may have been responsible for poor construction in
58
places where the levees breached. A team of engineers from LSU
who investigated the levee failures at the behest of the state of
Louisiana discovered that the piling extended only 10 feet below sea
level in some areas, rather than the 17 foot depth that was called for
in the design documents.59 Although a Corps of Engineers analysis of
the same pilings rejected this conclusion,60 the LSU scientists are
convinced that their assessment is correct because the measuring
equipment that they used is more accurate than the Corps’
equipment.61 The Berkeley/ASCE group also heard allegations of
malfeasance on the part of contractors in connection with the
construction of the levees and “some field evidence” appeared to
“correlate with those stories.”62 Berkeley Engineer Robert Bea
worried that the outside engineering firms and contractors may have
been more concerned with the bottom line than with identifying and
correcting problems in the design and construction of the levees.63
Louisiana’s attorney general has opened an investigation into these
64
allegations.
Finally, the Berkeley/ASCE group concluded that lax
maintenance practices may have contributed to the breach of some of
65
the levees lining the outfall canals. For example, large trees were

57. Warrick & Grunwald, supra note 42.
58. See John Schwartz, Panelist on Levees Faults Army Corps Budget Cuts, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2005, at A18 (“[S]ome functions once handled by the Corps, like soil boring and testing,
are now conducted by contractors.”).
59. John Schwartz & Christopher Drew, Louisiana’s Levee Inquiry Faults Army Corps,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at A28.
60. Tests on Key Levee in New Orleans Show Compliance, USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 2005, at
A4.
61. Mark Schleifstein, LSU Expert Defends Piling Tests, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 15, 2005,
at 3.
62. John Schwartz, Malfeasance Might have Hurt Levees, Engineers Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
3, 2005, at A22 (reporting testimony of Raymond B. Seed, leader of the Berkeley/ASCE group);
Warrick & Hsu, supra note 49 (same).
63. Schleifstein, supra note 56.
64. Christopher Drew, Inquiry to Seek Cause of Levee Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at
A21.
65. Vartabedian & Braun, supra note 50.
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allowed to grow at the base of some of the levees. According to
engineeers, the levee wall’s integrity could have been undermined by
decomposition and settlement of the soft soil supporting the levees,
creating “a maze of small cavities that become channels for water to
66
migrate from the canals,” which would further weaken the levees. In
addition, state and local officials have admitted that they typically
skipped the canal floodwalls when they were performing annual levee
inspections, and that the levees they did inspect were given only
cursory attention.67 The Corps of Engineers has not yet agreed with
these assessments, and has instead undertaken an extensive
68
investigation of the causes of the outlet canal levee failures.
Nevertheless, the information and analysis revealed thus far suggest
that the outlet canal walls were not overtopped and that the
downtown polder would not have flooded if the walls had withstood
the lateral pressure of the storm surge inside the canals, as they were
designed to do.69
2. Lake Borgne. The largest storm surge to hit the New Orleans
area came not from Lake Pontchartrain to the north but from Lake
Borgne to the east.70 Although the Corps enhanced the levees for the
polders protecting New Orleans East from Lake Borgne as part of the
high level plan, the estimated 18–25 foot storm surge exceeded the
height of some of the levees protecting that polder by as much as 5–10
feet.71 These levees were simply not high enough to repel the storm
72
surge, and they were “overwhelmed” and “massively eroded.”
Colonel Richard Wagenaar, the Corps’ head engineer for the New
Orleans district, reported that the eastern levees were “literally
leveled in places.”73 Large areas in this polder, which was inhabited

66. Bob Marshall, Levee Leaks Reported to S&WB a Year Ago, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 18,
2005, at 1.
67. Id.
68. Ralph Vartabedian, Levee Report Jibes With Early Speculation, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2005, at A31.
69. See Ralph Vartabedian, Study Sees Design Issue in Failures of Levees, L.A. TIMES, May
3, 2006, at A4 (noting that investigators for the Army Corps had issued a report concluding that
London Avenue levees failed due to erosion of the soil beneath the levee walls, much as earlier
reports had concluded with respect to the 17th Street breaches).
70. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-4.
71. Id. at 1-4 to -5.
72. Id. at 1-5.
73. Ralph Vartabedian, Much Wider Damage to Levees Is Disclosed, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2005, at A1.
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mainly by low-income residents and businesses that served local
communities, were flooded. Because this surge came from Lake
Borgne and not Lake Pontchartrain, it is clear that the barrier
project—had it been constructed during the 1980s—would not have
prevented this damage and might even have exacerbated it, by
deflecting some portion of the surge from the two passes to the
southern half of Lake Borgne. A protection system more massive in
scope that could have slowed or prevented a storm surge into Lake
Borgne—such as the huge seagate structures that are utilized to
74
protect the Netherlands from North Atlantic storms —might in
theory have provided better protection to New Orleans. No such
structures, however, were contemplated as part of the original barrier
plan.
3. The Navigation Canals. Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge also
proceeded from the Gulf of Mexico and Lake Borgne up the MRGO
Canal to the Industrial Canal in the heart of New Orleans. The
MRGO Canal, which was completed in 1968, is a deep-draft seaway
channel that extends for approximately 76 miles east and southeast of
New Orleans into Breton Sound and the Gulf of Mexico. It was
designed to shorten the distance for ships traveling from the eastern
shipping lanes of the Gulf to New Orleans, but it has never lived up to
its economic expectations.75 The storm surge overtopped the levees
running along these canals at “a number of locations,” and several
76
breaches occurred.
A post-Katrina modeling exercise undertaken by the LSU
Hurricane Center concluded that the “funneling” effect of the
MRGO Canal, which narrows from 2000 feet wide where it intersects
the Intercoastal Waterway to 200 feet wide where it bisects the
Industrial Canal, intensified the initial storm surge by about 20
74. Molly Moore, Rethinking Defenses Against Sea’s Power, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2005, at
A22.
75. See Michael Grunwald, Canal May Have Worsened City’s Flooding, WASH. POST, Sept.
14, 2005, at A21 (stating that less than 3 percent, or less than one ship per day, of the Port of
New Orleans’ cargo traffic uses the MRGO and that critics have calculated MRGO’s cost to
taxpayers at more than twelve thousand dollars per vessel per day). But see Lake Pontchartrain
Basin Foundation, Martello Castle Background Information, http://wetmaap.org/Martello_
Castle/Supplement/mc_background.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2006) (suggesting that the
MRGO has generated over one billion dollars a year in revenue for the city of New Orleans
even though the United States Army Corps of Engineers spends about seven to eight million
dollars a year to maintain the MRGO).
76. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-5.
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percent and increased the velocity of the surge from three to 6–8 feet
77
per second. G. Paul Kemp, an oceanographer at the LSU Hurricane
Center, concluded that the MRGO funnel was “a back door into New
Orleans,” and he had little doubt that it “was the initial cause of the
disaster.”78 As a result of these levee failures, large areas of flooding
occurred to the south and north of the MRGO canal, within the
polders containing St. Bernard Parish and the Ninth Ward, and New
Orleans East.79 As with the storm surge from Lake Borgne, the
barrier project would not have protected the two flooded polders
from the surge that overtopped and breached the levees along the
MRGO Canal, because no protection systems were contemplated to
prevent the funneling effect of the canal.
The levees lining the Industrial Canal experienced a number of
much smaller failures along both of the canal’s banks. Several
breaches occurred along the eastern bank between the MRGO Canal
to the south and Lake Pontchartrain to the north.80 These breaches
allowed water to flow to the east into the New Orleans East polder.
The levees along the western edge of the Industrial Canal were
breached in three places located almost directly across from the point
at which the MRGO Canal adjoins the Industrial Canal.81 The
Berkeley/ASCE group concluded that “storm surges overtopped
82
numerous stretches of levees along this Canal frontage.” The LSU
Hurricane Center’s post-Katrina modeling exercise concluded that
the enhanced velocity of the storm surge as it traveled up the MRGO
Canal also contributed to the scouring that undermined the levees
along the Industrial Canal.83 These after-the-fact analyses are
consistent with the contemporaneous observations of the lockmaster
on the Industrial Canal, who reported to the Corps of Engineers that
the surge reached that canal before dawn and overflowed on both
84
sides. The lockmaster’s observations also cast doubt on the claim
that the surge from Lake Pontchartrain caused the levee failures on

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Warrick & Grunwald, supra note 42.
Id.
SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-5.
Id. at 1-10 fig.1.4.
Id.
Id. at 2-9.
Warrick & Grunwald, supra note 42.
John McQuaid, Katrina Trapped City in Double Disasters, TIMES-PICAYUNE
BREAKING NEWS WEBLOG, Sept. 7, 2005, http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/
mtlogs/nola_Times-Picayune/archives/2005_09_07.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
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the Industrial Canal because, according to the Corps of Engineers
New Orleans Project Manager, the Lake Pontchartrain surge
occurred much later in the morning, after the hurricane’s eye had
passed east of the city and winds from the north began to force water
85
to the south toward the city.
It is theoretically possible that the overtopping and resultant
erosion of the Industrial Canal levees would have occurred even in
the absence of the MRGO Canal because of the subsequent storm
surge from Lake Pontchartrain. However, the conclusion that the
storm surge from the MRGO Canal caused the levees along the
Industrial Canal to fail is amply supported by hindsight observations
of the Industrial Canal levees, hindsight re-creation of the storm
surge
using
sophisticated
mathematical
models,
and
contemporaneous observations by at least one eyewitness.
II. THE BLAME GAME
The preceding description of the complex system of levees that
was supposed to protect New Orleans at the time of Hurricane
Katrina suggests that the question posed in the introduction to this
article—“Why did the levees fail?—is framed too broadly or, perhaps,
too simplistically. In fact, many levees failed in many places for many
different reasons. Some were overtopped by floodwaters that then
scoured out the levee support from inside the protected area. Others
could not withstand the direct pressure of the storm surge from
outside the protected area because they were not embedded
sufficiently deeply in the underlying soils. Some floodwalls may have
come apart during the storm surge because connections between
individual wall sections failed. Future investigations will no doubt
uncover still other suggested reasons for the various levee failures
that occurred during the Katrina storm surge.
Because the levee systems divided the city and surrounding areas
into polders, the failure of the levee system protecting one polder did
not necessarily contribute to the damage caused by the failure of the
levee system protecting a different polder. Some areas of the city
would not have flooded had one levee system held, even if the others
had failed. Other areas of the city would not have flooded had two
levee systems both held, but would have flooded if either of the two
failed. All of these inquiries are essentially engineering questions and
85.

Id.
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are best answered through detailed field investigations and complex
mathematical modeling exercises. Still, although correct answers to
these questions are relevant to the post-Katrina blame game, they will
not by themselves be sufficient to resolve the broader issues raised by
Katrina, including the prominent contention that NEPA played a
causal role in the New Orleans flooding.86
Not long after the damage to New Orleans became apparent, a
retired Corps of Engineers official, conservative pundits, and
politicians began a campaign to blame the damage on a lawsuit
brought against the Corps of Engineers in 1976 by local fishermen
and a local environmental group called Save Our Wetlands.87 Citing
that litigation and other clearly irrelevant litigation involving the
Mississippi River levee system far upstream of New Orleans,
conservative commentator R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr. claimed that “[f]or
too long, environmentalist fanatics with no sense of a broad-based
commonweal have had a veto over government and private-sector
projects essential to the health and well-being of millions of
Americans.”88 A columnist for FrontPage online magazine referred to
the Save our Wetlands litigation as “green genocide.”89 The chairman
of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee asked the
Justice Department to investigate whether any environmental
litigation might have played a role in the New Orleans flooding, and
high level officials in that Department circulated an email to line

86. See, e.g., Alan Levin & Peter Eisler, Many Decisions Led to Failed Levees, USA
TODAY, Nov. 3, 2005, at 3A (arguing that metal gates were never built because local officials
believed the gates would have interfered with the city’s network of pump stations); Tyrell, Jr.,
supra note 8; John Berlau, Greens vs. Levees, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Sept. 8, 2005, http://www.
nationalreview.com/comment/berlau200509080824.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2006) (stating that
Environmental Protection Agency reviews can delay projects by years); Bruce McQuain, You
Can Pay Me Now or You Can Pay Me Later, THE QANDO BLOG, Sept. 17, 2005, http://www.
qando.net/details.aspx?Entry=2595 (last visited Aug. 15, 2006) (arguing that the failure to satisfy
federal environmental laws stopped the barrier project).
87. See Adriel Bettelheim, Corps Controversy Builds on Gulf Coast, CONG. Q. WKLY.,
Sept. 12, 2005, at 2381, 2382 (reporting comments of former Representative Robert L.
Livingston); Oliver A. Houck, The U.S. House of Representatives’ Task Force on NEPA: The
Professors Speak, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,895, 10,897 (2005) (describing post-Katrina efforts
“claiming that it was the environmentalists who drowned New Orleans”); Ralph Vartabedian &
Peter Pae, A Barrier that Could Have Been, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at A1 (discussing opinion
of former Corps of Engineers chief counsel Joseph Towers).
88. Tyrell, Jr., supra note 8.
89. Michael Tremoglie, New Orleans: A Green Genocide, FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM,
Sept. 8, 2005, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/printable.asp?ID=19418 (last visited Aug.
15, 2006).
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attorneys asking for information about cases in which they had
defended the Corps of Engineers from environmental claims
90
involving the levees protecting New Orleans. The House Task Force
on Improving the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA Task
Force”)—already controversial due to its perceived heavyhandedness and overtly politicized agenda91—decided to add the Save
Our Wetlands litigation to its agenda as it considered possible
92
amendments to NEPA.
93
The plaintiffs filed Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Rush in 1976,
some time after work had begun on the levees between New Orleans
and the passes at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur, but before work
had been initiated on the barrier structures. The plaintiffs claimed
that the FEIS that the Corps of Engineers had prepared for the
barrier project did not meet the requirements of Section 102 of
NEPA in several regards. In particular, they claimed that the FEIS
had not adequately addressed the potential adverse impact of the
structures on the normal tidal flows of water between Lake Borgne
and Lake Pontchartrain. In their view, the flows were critical to
maintaining the vitality of the Lake Pontchartrain fishery and the
overall integrity of the marine ecosystem.
The district court held that the FEIS was in fact inadequate. It
concluded that “the picture of the project painted in the FEIS was not
in fact a tested conclusion but a hope by the persons planning the
project that it could in fact be constructed so as to meet the
environmental objectives set out in the FEIS.”94 The court noted that
the chief engineer for the Corps’ New Orleans Division had requested
further model studies because the studies upon which the draft EIS
relied were undertaken more than a decade earlier, and had
addressed an obsolete version of the project. The chief engineer

90. Dan Eggen, Senate Panel Investigating Challenges to Levees, WASH. POST, Sept. 17,
2005, at A10; Mitchell, supra note 19.
91. See Houck, supra note 87, at 10,896–98 (describing controversy surrounding the NEPA
Task Force).
92. Ralph Vartabedian & Richard B. Schmitt, Mid-60s Project Fuels Environmental Fight,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005, at A22; Press Release, Task Force on Improving the Nat’l Envtl.
Policy Act, U.S. Reps to Review Environmental Reg’s Role in Affordable Energy, Post-Katrina
Development (Sept. 8, 2005), http://resoucrescommittee.house.gov/neptaskforce/press/
0809virginia.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2006).
93. Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Rush, No. 75-3710, slip op. (E.D. La. 1977), http://www.
saveourwetlands.org/77-schwartz.htm.
94. Id.
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feared that the flow of water between the lakes would be far less in
the new version of the project than in the earlier version. The Corps’
environmental staff initiated the requested model studies, but had not
completed them when the FEIS came out. Even though more
appropriate studies were on the way, the FEIS continued to rely upon
the obsolete studies, and this unexplained impatience on the part of
95
the Corps clearly troubled the court.
The court was also troubled by the content of the analysis that
the FEIS did provide and the role of upper level officials in
determining that content. The biological analysis presented in the
FEIS relied entirely on a single telephone conversation with a marine
biologist who was asked to speculate about the impact of the project
on marine organisms using the interlake flow rates predicted by the
obsolete model. The Corps of Engineers official responsible for
preparing the EIS expressed reservations about key statements made
about the effects of the structures on marine life in the lake, and he
suggested that the document’s conclusion that the project “would
not” have a significant impact on lake biology should at least be
changed to “should not.” That official, however, was overruled by his
superiors. In addition, the assessment of the barrier project’s benefits
included the benefits of further urban development on wetlands that
would be reclaimed from the lake after the project was completed,
but it failed to take into consideration the fact that the area had also
been designated as a protected wetland. A Corps economist had
pointed this out and asked that the analysis be modified accordingly.
He, too, was overruled by upper level officials.96
The court concluded that in light of “the problems of which the
Corps was aware with respect to the possibility of significantly
decreased tidal flow through the structures,” the analysis of
alternatives in the FEIS was inadequate. The court concluded that the
FEIS “precludes both the public and the governmental parties from
the opportunity to fairly and adequately analyze the benefits and
detriments of the proposed plan and any alternatives to it.”97 It
therefore enjoined further work on the barrier structures until the
Corps had completed an adequate FEIS. The court made clear,
however, that its opinion and order should “in no way be construed as
precluding the Lake Pontchartrain project as proposed or reflecting
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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on its advisability in any manner,” and it stressed that “[u]pon proper
compliance with the law with regard to the impact statement, this
injunction will be dissolved and any hurricane plan thus properly
98
presented will be allowed to proceed.”
III. HINDSIGHT ANALYSIS OF THE NEW ORLEANS FLOODING
The starting point in a hindsight causation analysis is careful
historical reconstruction of the event in question. The analyst must
then compare that reconstruction to a hypothetical scenario in which
the act or omission alleged to be the cause of the consequence at issue
did not occur. If, in this alternative state of the world, the harmful
event still occurs, then the suspected act or omission is not a but-for
cause of the event.99 Proper hindsight analysis therefore requires both
an accurate reconstruction of the actual history of the event and a
persuasive analysis of the appropriate counterfactual scenario. Of
course, such but-for causation analysis by itself is insufficient for
purposes of assigning legal or moral responsibility, given the variety
of other considerations that ultimately must be brought to bear on the
situation in order to move from but-for to blameworthiness analysis.100
Nevertheless, the but-for method of identifying contributing causes
does provide a conventional starting point for the ultimate attribution
of responsibility. For the post-Katrina debate over NEPA, therefore,
the first important question to ask is whether, but for Save Our
Wetlands, the catastrophic flooding of New Orleans would still have
occurred. This Part answers that question.
A. The Lake Borgne and MRGO Levee Failures
From the engineering analysis related above,101 it seems clear
beyond cavil that the waters that flooded the New Orleans East
polder, which lies north of the MRGO Canal and west of the
intersection of the MRGO Canal and the Intercoastal Waterway,
came directly from Lake Borgne and indirectly from the Gulf of
Mexico via the MRGO Canal. The flooding of the polder to the south
of the MRGO Canal and to the east of the Industrial Canal resulted

98.
99.

Id.
H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 110–14 (2d ed. 1985); W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984).
100. See supra text accompanying note 99.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 75–85.
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when waters flowing up the MRGO Canal overtopped the levees
along that canal and brought waters into the interior of the polder.
This flooding took place before the eye of Hurricane Katrina passed
to the east of the city and began to drive waters from Lake
Pontchartrain up the Industrial Canal and the outfall canals in the
downtown polder. It clearly did not result from waters entering Lake
Pontchartrain from Lake Borgne at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur
passes. Had the barrier project been constructed, the flooding of this
area would still have occurred due to waters entering the polder
directly from Lake Borgne and traveling up the MRGO Canal from
Lake Borgne and the Gulf of Mexico. It is even possible that the
flooding of the New Orleans East area would have been worse if the
barrier plan had been implemented, given the likelihood that more of
the surge would have been directed along these channels. Thus,
hindsight causation analysis strongly suggests that the lawsuit was not
to blame for any of this flooding, and few uncertainties cloud this
analysis.
B. The Industrial Canal Levee Failures
Hindsight analysis offers a somewhat less certain answer to the
question of whether the overtopping of the levees on the west bank of
the Industrial Canal would have occurred had the Corps of Engineers
not abandoned the barrier project. That project was designed to
reduce the chance that a storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain would
breach the levees along the lake and along the canals that open to
that lake. It also provided for a navigation lock, rock dike, and gated
flood control structure where the Industrial Canal enters Lake
Pontchartrain. Had the barrier project been completed and had it
functioned properly (a topic addressed in the next Section102), it would
have added to the protection of areas placed at risk from overtopping
of the Industrial Canal levees, to the extent that the risk was
attributable to waters from Lake Pontchartrain.
The engineers have agreed that the levees on the Industrial
Canal were overtopped and that the breaches probably occurred
because waters that flowed over the levees scoured out the soils
behind those levees.103 Engineering analysis of the levees after the
flood, hindsight modeling, and the contemporaneous observations of

102.
103.

See infra Part III.C.
See supra text accompanying note 49.
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the lockmaster all converge on the conclusion that the waters that
overtopped the levees in the Industrial Canal came from Lake
Borgne and points east, rather than from Lake Pontchartrain. The
fact that the Lake Pontchartrain storm surge did not overtop the
levees bordering the outlet canals during Hurricane Katrina further
supports the conclusion that the levees bordering the Industrial
Canal, which parallels those canals, would not have been overtopped
in the absence of the larger storm surge that flowed up the MRGO
Canal. The fact that the storm surge that flowed up the MRGO Canal
did overtop the levees bordering that canal suggests that the MRGO
surge had the capacity to overtop the levees on the Industrial Canal
as the surge proceeded westward. Finally, the fact that the damaged
portions of the levees along the west side of the Industrial Canal were
directly across from the point at which the MRGO Canal enters the
Industrial Canal at a right angle is also consistent with the conclusion
that the waters that overtopped the Industrial Canal levees came
from Lake Borgne and the east, and not from Lake Pontchartrain.
As the prior discussion reveals, the barrier project would not
have prevented the storm surge that moved westward along the
MRGO Canal. Indeed, had the gated flood control structure at the
entrance of the Industrial Canal to Lake Pontchartrain been closed as
envisioned in the barrier project, it could have exacerbated the effects
of the storm surge moving along the MRGO Canal when it arrived at
the Industrial Canal by preventing water from exiting the Industrial
Canal into Lake Pontchartrain. It appears, therefore, that the failure
to build the barrier project did not cause the flooding that resulted
from the failure of the levees along the Industrial Canal. That
conclusion cannot be stated as confidently as the prior conclusion
about the flooding that resulted from the failures of the levees along
the MRGO Canal, because the Industrial Canal was directly
connected to Lake Pontchartrain and the barrier project (had it
functioned properly) would have offered protection against waters
from that lake. Moreover, it is still possible—though not likely—that
all of the preliminary analyses are wrong and that the
contemporaneous observations were mistaken.
C. The 17th Street and London Avenue Levee Failures
There is no dispute that the storm surge that caused the 17th
Street and London Avenue levee failures originated in Lake
Pontchartrain. To the extent that the force of the Lake Pontchartrain
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storm surge would have been reduced by the barrier project, some or
all of the downtown polder may not have flooded had it been
completed prior to Katrina. This is not a minor matter, because the
greatest economic damage occurred in the downtown polder, and it
appears that the largest number of deaths also occurred in that
polder.104 Even if Save Our Wetlands did not cause all of the flooding
in the New Orleans area, the claim that it caused the flooding of the
downtown polder alone is an extremely serious one that bears careful
analysis.
Several large uncertainties, however, complicate but-for causal
analysis of the connection between Save Our Wetlands and the
flooding of the downtown polder. First, the storm surge from Lake
Pontchartrain did not overtop the levees protecting the city from the
lake itself, nor were the levees breached. Moreover, all of the
engineering reports that have come to light thus far have concluded
that the surge flowing from Lake Pontchartrain up the outfall canals
did not overtop the levees lining those canals. Like the levees along
the lake, those levees were designed to be of sufficient height to resist
overtopping from the SPH, and Katrina apparently did not generate a
storm surge exceeding that height. Most engineers have concluded
that the levees along the 17th Street and London Avenue outfall
canals failed because the storm surge forced parts of the floodwalls
away from the canals and into the surrounding neighborhoods. The
Lake Pontchartrain storm surge did not overwhelm those levees; it
simply defeated them at critical weak points. Although the
engineering analysis is still clouded with considerable uncertainty, it
appears that those levees were either designed or constructed in a
fashion that prevented them from doing what they were supposed to
do.105
This conclusion, however, does not necessarily lead directly to
the ultimate conclusion that the failure to construct the barrier
project was not a but-for cause of the flooding of the downtown
polder. Even if it is true that a cause of the failure of the outfall canal
levees was improper design or improper construction, it is equally

104. John Simerman, Dwight Ou & Ted Mellnik, Canal Breaches Led to Most New Orleans
Deaths, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 30, 2005, at A1.
105. See John M. Barry, Op-Ed., After the Deluge, Some Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
2005, at A27 (citing three preliminary post-Katrina engineering studies for the proposition that
“if the levees had performed as they were supposed to, the deaths in New Orleans proper, the
scenes in the Superdome and the city’s destruction would never have taken place”).
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clear that neither of those factors caused the levees to fail in the
absence of the storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain. More to the
point, it is certainly possible that the storm surge in Lake
Pontchartrain would have been much less powerful had barrier gates
at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes been in place and closed
before Katrina hit. The resulting storm surge may then have lacked
sufficient force to breach the outfall canal levees even at their
weakest points. Viewed somewhat differently, the barrier project may
have provided a critical margin of safety for the overall system that
would have prevented the flooding of the downtown polder, allowing
for the possibility that the outfall canals would have been negligently
constructed or maintained.
A proper hindsight analysis to test this hypothesis would have to
estimate the force of the storm surge in Lake Pontchartrain under the
assumption that the seagates at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes
had been properly designed and constructed and had been properly
closed prior to the time that the surge from Hurricane Katrina moved
from the Gulf of Mexico and Lake Borgne into Lake Pontchartrain.
The outcome of this analysis is by no means certain. For example, a
spokesperson for the New Orleans division of the Corps
acknowledged after Hurricane Katrina that he was not sure “how
much [the barrier project] would have prevented anything.”106 Other
reports suggest that
Corps staff believe that flooding would have been worse if the
original proposed design had been built because the storm surge
would likely have gone over the top of the barrier and floodgates,
flooded Lake Pontchartrain, and gone over the original lower levees
107
planned for the lakefront area as part of the barrier plan.

It is necessary to go beyond these statements, however, given
that Army Corps representatives have obvious reasons for
discounting the likelihood that the barrier plan would have
performed better than the high level plan. A proper analysis of how
the barrier plan would have fared during Katrina would require a
complex modeling exercise that would in turn require the analyst to

106.
107.

Mitchell, supra note 19.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS LAKE
PONTCHARTRAIN AND VICINITY HURRICANE PROTECTION PROJECT: TESTIMONY BEFORE
THE SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY AND WATER DEV. OF THE H. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS 6
(2005) (emphasis added) [hereinafter GAO REPORT, CORPS OF ENGINEERS].
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determine the height of the storm surge at the passes and compare it
to the design height of the levees and seagates. As noted previously,
the project was designed to withstand the SPH, which in New Orleans
108
was roughly equivalent to a fast-moving Category Three Hurricane.
Although the media initially reported expert conclusions that Katrina
was a Category Four Hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson scale when the
109
eye passed to the east of New Orleans, subsequent analyses of the
water levels along the levees have suggested that the storm may have
weakened to Category Three status by the time the storm surge from
Lake Pontchartrain hit the city.110 The Saffir-Simpson scale, in any
event, is based on wind speed and not predicted storm surge levels,
and in some circumstances it may be possible for a Category Two
storm to produce a storm surge that exceeds that of a Category Three
storm.111 Hence, even estimating the height of the storm surge at the
Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes is fraught with uncertainty.
If the storm surge would have exceeded the height of the levees
and seagates between Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne, then the
surge would have entered the lake at an attenuated level and
probably at a lower velocity. This alone, however, would not have
prevented a surge in Lake Pontchartrain because the strong
northeasterly winds produced by the hurricane still would have
caused water that was already in the lake to surge against the levees
protecting New Orleans. Some of that water would have surged up
the ungated outfall canals and that surge would have tested the
levees. Whether the seagates would have reduced the surge from
Lake Pontchartrain sufficiently to prevent the breach of poorly
designed or constructed levees is therefore an exceedingly complex
question, the answer to which would require expertise in
meteorology, hydrology, engineering, mathematical modeling, and
probably other disciplines. Certainly one cannot conclude without a
great deal of additional analysis that the barrier project as conceived
in the early 1970s—even if perfectly implemented and executed—

108. John McQuaid, New Orleans Levee System Left Poor Neighborhoods Vulnerable,
NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 20, 2005, available at http://www.newhousenews.com/archive/
mcquaid092105.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2006); McQuaid & Schleifstein, supra note 18;
Mitchell, supra note 19.
109. Martin & Zajac, supra note 3.
110. See supra note 19.
111. McQuaid, supra note 108.
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would have prevented the downtown polder from flooding during
Hurricane Katrina.
Moreover, even if the analysts could confidently reach that
conclusion, a proper hindsight analysis would also need to take into
account an alternative scenario in which the barrier project was not
properly implemented. If it is true, for example, that the high level
project was poorly implemented, there may be good reason to
question whether the barrier project would have been implemented
as designed. A proper hindsight analysis would therefore factor in the
possibility that the levees running from the city to the Rigolets and
Chef Menteur passes or the seagates at the passes would have been
breached, just as the levees along the outfall canals were breached. It
might also examine the scenario in which the seagates were not
properly closed in anticipation of the hurricane; given the numerous
instances of official breakdown that occurred as Katrina and its
aftermath actually unfolded, such a possibility is not at all farfetched.
In either case, the storm surge flowing into Lake Pontchartrain from
the Gulf of Mexico and Lake Borgne would have been much larger,
and the surge that moved up the outfall canals might not have
differed greatly from the surge that did in fact move up those canals
during Hurricane Katrina.
The hindsight analysis would next have to examine the effect of
Save Our Wetlands on the Corps of Engineers’ decision not to build
the barrier project. Some legal analysts, including the United States
Government Accountability Office, have concluded that the Save
Our Wetlands injunction should have delayed the barrier option only
until the Corps remedied the problems that the court had identified in
112
the EIS. There is little reason to believe that the court would not
have lifted the injunction as soon as the Corps of Engineers updated
the EIS with adequate hydrological modeling (as requested by its own
chief engineer), conducted a more thorough biological assessment,
and considered a few reasonable alternatives. This may have delayed
the completion of the project during the time that it took for the
Corps to finish this task and defend its product in court. Although
further hypothetical analysis would be required to determine whether
this would have delayed completion of the barriers past August 2005,
there is little reason to believe that completion would not have

112. See Houck, supra note 87, at 10,897 (“Usually the Corps rewrote its statements and
proceeded, although often with environmental modifications and mitigation.”).
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proceeded at least as quickly as the high level project, which did not
get started until 1985 but which was substantially completed by the
time that Hurricane Katrina hit.
Of course, the Corps of Engineers did not respond to the
injunction by preparing an adequate EIS for the barrier plan. Instead,
it reexamined the mounting cost of the barrier project in light of the
cost of the alternative high level project and decided to implement
the latter project. Thus, one could argue that the litigation caused the
Corps to rethink the alternatives in a manner that might not have
occurred absent the litigation-induced pause to rethink.113 If the Corps
would have forged ahead with the original barrier project despite its
increasing cost and despite strong local opposition, then the lawsuit
was indeed a but-for cause of the failure to implement the barrier
project—albeit only in an attenuated, happenstance way. The
likelihood of even that scenario, moreover, must be discounted by the
probability that the Corps would have changed course at some point
anyway prior to completing the project, given the variety of other
considerations that began to weigh against the barrier plan.
D. From But-For to Blameworthiness
In a world of complexity and interconnection, any single event
will be traceable to innumerable but-for causes that led to the event’s
occurrence.114 With respect to the levee failures in New Orleans, for
instance, potential causal contributors include not only Save Our
Wetlands, which is said to have led the Corps to adopt an inferior
levee plan, but also the local residents and officials who long opposed
more robust protection plans out of cost concerns.115 Additional
contributors could include the Corps officials who, after a lengthy and
unexplained delay, ultimately made the decision to switch from the
barrier to the high level plan; the contractors who allegedly
implemented the high level plan with inadequate care; the land use
planning officials whose decisions to permit massive conversion of
wetlands for development rendered New Orleans much more

113. See David Schoenbrod, The Lawsuit That Sank New Orleans, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26,
2005, at A18 (arguing that the Corps of Engineers cannot be expected to resume a project
where it left off when that project has been halted by litigation).
114. See Kenneth J. Rothman, Causation and Causal Inference in Epidemiology, 95 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH S144, S145 (2005) (explaining the concept of multicausality).
115. 1982 GAO REPORT, supra note 37, app. I at 9 (noting that local interests requested
study of a 100-year design hurricane rather than the more severe standard project hurricane).
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vulnerable to storm surges regardless of which plan was adopted; the
government officials who were responsible for the Mississippi River
flood protection system, which also perversely made New Orleans
much more vulnerable to Gulf Coast storms. Perhaps the list would
even include the incalculable number of causal contributors to
human-induced climate change, which might in theory have played a
116
role in exacerbating Katrina’s intensity.
Apportioning responsibility and fault among these many but-for
causes requires much more than simply empirical analysis and
reconstruction. It requires an assignation of blameworthiness
according to moral, political, and legal criteria. For seemingly
opportunistic reasons, a number of officials and analysts have
attempted to single out Save Our Wetlands for particularly severe
blameworthiness in the aftermath of Katrina. If the preliminary
engineering reports turn out to be correct, however, then the most
damaging flooding in the New Orleans area is attributable most
obviously and directly to the MRGO and to inadequate construction
and maintenance of the 17th Street and London Avenue levees, not
117
Analysts who wish to pin
to the design of the LPVHPP.
responsibility for the Katrina disaster on NEPA must therefore offer
an account not only of how Save Our Wetlands led to the adoption of
the high level plan, but also how the litigation led to malfeasance in
the implementation of that plan. No serious effort has been made to
offer such an account, nor is it obvious how one could be constructed
with any degree of plausibility.
In the end, the only clear but-for consequence of Save Our
Wetlands was a court-imposed moment of taking stock, a moment in
which the Army Corps was asked to reevaluate a long-troubled
project in light of better information, changed circumstances, and
competing values—precisely the point of the NEPA procedure. The
Corps ultimately retained discretion to proceed with the barrier plan
after conducting a proper environmental impact assessment, and it
certainly need not have waited nearly seven years before deciding to

116. See Kerry Emanuel, Increasing Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones Over the Past 30
Years, 436 NATURE 686, 686 (2005) (arguing that hurricane intensity will increase as mean
global temperatures rise).
117. See Houck, supra note 87, at 10,897 n.28 (“Bottom line: the levee plan was fine, but its
faulty construction flooded the city.”).
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118
abandon the barrier plan as it did. In short, one simply cannot
account for the Corps’ behavior by focusing on NEPA and Save Our
Wetlands alone. Instead, to appreciate why the Corps planning and
implementation process for the LPVHPP took the shape that it did,
one must broaden the critical focus to include the Congress, Army
Corps leaders and staff, local residents and officials, scientific and
engineering experts, government contractors, local and national
political interests, and a variety of other key decisionmakers and
influences. As the next Part describes, these numerous forces
combined in New Orleans to create a policymaking process that, at
least in hindsight, seems to have been especially handicapped in its
ability to grapple with long-term catastrophic potentialities—the very
point of natural disaster policy.

IV. LESSONS FOR ANALYSTS FROM THE KATRINA LEVEE DEBATE
One obvious message of the forgoing discussion is that
retrospective analysis of cause and effect can be an exceedingly
complex and uncertainty-laden exercise. The fact that all of the
relevant facts are in the past and can, at least in theory, be accurately
ascertained does not mean that retrospective analysis can avoid the
speculation that is inherent in prospective analysis: the counterfactual
nature of the causation exercise demands a similar task of projecting
unknown states of the world in order to determine what would have
eventuated in the absence of the targeted causal factor. Hindsight
analysis of the Katrina disaster suggests that in a changing world, the
farther removed the analysis is in time from the event under
inspection, the more difficult it will be to draw confident conclusions
about cause and effect. Failing memories and lost documentation can,
of course, hinder attempts to reconstruct past histories. In addition,
intervening events can greatly complicate the construction and
analysis of counterfactual scenarios. The more relevant intervening
events that are possible, the more the counterfactual narrative will
become clouded by uncertainties.
In short, as one moves farther away from the available data—
whether simply in terms of time, or of the number of additional
118. Complying with NEPA following the 1977 injunction is not the only time that the
Corps seems to have dragged its feet on New Orleans hurricane protection matters: in 1999,
Congress appropriated money for a $12 million study to determine how much it would cost to
protect New Orleans from a Category Five hurricane, but the study had not even been launched
as of September 2005. Martin & Zajac, supra note 3.
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variables or intervening events—the risk increases that one’s
conclusions will be based on undefended modeling assumptions
119
rather than on actual empirical evidence. The NEPA Task Force,
many of whose members have expressed a strong desire to reduce
NEPA’s procedural requirements, seems to have fallen prey to just
such an undefended assumption in its haste to attribute the Katrina
levee failures to NEPA litigation. Hindsight analysis of the Katrina
disaster offers no support at all for legislative action aimed at
repealing or amending NEPA to reduce the incidence of judicial
intervention into executive branch activities under that statute. As
previously discussed, the causal analysis that leads from a 1977
injunction pending the preparation of an adequate EIS to the
flooding of the downtown polder in 2005 is so laden with uncertainty,
and so dependant on unsupported speculation, that it simply cannot
provide a rational justification for an action as momentous as
overhauling one of modern federal environmental law’s keystone
statutes.
Nevertheless, as this Part describes, the history of the LPVHPP
planning process does offer some reliable lessons regarding the
challenge of natural disaster policymaking—lessons that should guide
analysts as they consider post-Katrina hurricane protection for New
Orleans and other projects that guard against long-term, lowprobability, high-consequence events. The rather pessimistic
conclusion we have reached regarding our powers of accurate,
comprehensive hindsight analysis is likewise applicable to our
predictive analysis of future consequences of government
interventions. The systems that drive the incidence and severity of
disaster consequences—whether in the form of natural systems that
give rise to extreme weather and geological events, or of
socioeconomic systems that determine in part how deadly and costly
the consequences of such events will be—are characterized by
enormous complexity and uncertainty. What often will be required in
disaster planning, therefore, is collective judgment regarding the
degree of moral and political commitment that citizens desire to
express, both to their fellow citizens within the present generation
and to the generations to come, through public prevention and
mitigation projects that may have highly uncertain long-term payoffs.

119. Gary King & Langche Zeng, When Can History be Our Guide? The Pitfalls of
Counterfactual Inference, INT’L STUD. Q. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 2), available at
http://gking.harvard.edu/files/counterf.pdf.
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As this Part describes, through familiar tools of risk assessment and
policy analysis, the LPVHPP planning process seems to have
inadvertently obscured the need for precisely that brand of judgment.
A. The Standard Project Hurricane
In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many
commentators assumed that New Orleans had finally outrun its luck.
As noted previously, initial reports suggested that Katrina made
landfall as a storm with a severity and a path that numerous experts
repeatedly had warned would someday strike the city with
catastrophic results, a storm that simply overwhelmed the design
standard of the LPVHPP and other New Orleans area levee
systems.120 At least at this stage, however, engineering reports point
instead to a failure of implementation, such that it is quite possible
that Katrina would not have overwhelmed the New Orleans levees
had they been constructed and maintained properly. Still, this more
mundane and lamentable explanation of the Katrina levee failure
does not obviate the need to look closely at the levee design process
for evidence of significant failures in our thinking about long-term
catastrophic risks. Unfortunately, the many pre-Katrina warnings that
seemed so prophetic in the storm’s immediate aftermath remain
urgently relevant today, both to the post-Katrina reconstruction
process and to the challenge of natural disaster policy more generally.
At the heart of the LPVHPP and most other Army Corps
hurricane protection projects since the 1960s has been a technical
model known as the standard project hurricane (SPH).121 Because
development of this model preceded the Saffir-Simpson hurricane
scale, attempts to describe the design standard of the LPVHPP in the
wake of Katrina have been somewhat confused. Depending on
whether one is referring to barometric pressure, radius, wind speed,
or other critical storm characteristics, the SPH can vary from a
Category Two to Four storm on the now more familiar SaffirSimpson scale,122 although most commentators have been describing
the SPH as “roughly equivalent” to a fast-moving Category Three
storm.123 Nor does the SPH translate smoothly into the conventional
120. See supra note 3.
121. See Harry S. Perdikis, Hurricane Flood Protection in the United States, 93 J. OF THE
WATERWAYS & HARBORS DIVISION, Feb. 1967, at 3–8.
122. GAO REPORT, HURRICANE PROTECTION, supra note 16, at 4–5.
123. E.g., GAO REPORT, CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 107, at 4.
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return period approach of describing storms in relation to their
expected interval of occurrence. Again, analysts have been describing
the SPH as comparable to the worst storm that could be expected
124
every 200 to 300 years, although in actuality the SPH bears no direct
relationship to such return-period or frequency intervals. As the
National Weather Service stated in a 1972 technical memorandum,
125
“the standard project hurricane has no frequency assigned to it.”
The SPH was developed by the Corps of Engineers in the 1950s
at the request of Congress “to provide generalized hurricane
specifications that are consistent geographically and meteorologically
for use in planning, evaluating, and establishing hurricane design
126
criteria for hurricane protection works.” In conjunction with the
U.S. Weather Bureau, the Corps compiled data on all tropical storms
of hurricane intensity within specific geographic zones over the
period from 1900 to 1956.127 Using this data, the agencies created an
index representing “the most severe combination of hurricane
parameters that is reasonably characteristic of a specified
geographical region, excluding extremely rare combinations.”128
Specifically, central barometric pressure was used as the main
estimation characteristic to generate a hypothetical or model storm
for project planning with respect to any given geographic area.
Although the original SPH model used a 100-year return period to
identify the key central pressure measure for a given area,129 the
resulting model hurricane did not, strictly speaking, represent a 100year storm. Instead, the 100-year pressure low was interpolated with
other storm characteristics such as storm radius, wind speed, forward
speed, and storm direction to generate “the most severe
conditions . . . that are within the parameters of the SPH indices . . .

124.
125.

See supra text accompanying note 17.
HYDROMETEOROLOGICAL BRANCH, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
MEMORANDUM HUR 7–120, PRELIMINARY REVISED STANDARD PROJECT HURRICANE
CRITERIA FOR THE ATLANTIC AND GULF COASTS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1972).
126. HOWARD E. GRAHAM & DWIGHT E. NUNN, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L
HURRICANE RESEARCH PROJECT REPORT NO. 33, METEOROLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
PERTINENT TO STANDARD PROJECT HURRICANE, ATLANTIC AND GULF COASTS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1 (1959). For a nontechnical overview of the standard project hurricane and
related engineering issues, see J.J. Westerink & R.A. Leuttich, The Creeping Storm, CIV.
ENGINEERING MAG., June 2003, at 46, 48–52.
127. GRAHAM & NUNN, supra note 126, at 3, 72–73.
128. Perdikis, supra note 121, at 9.
129. GRAHAM & NUNN, supra note 126, at 3.
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130
for [a particular] location,” a procedure that resulted in SPH storms
of varying frequency depending on location-specific criteria.
Initially, an overriding goal of the SPH appears to have been
simply a desire to compare hurricane protection standards from
region to region: “The standard project hurricane wind field and
parameters represent a ‘standard’ against which the degree of
protection finally selected for a hurricane protection project may be
judged and compared with protection provided at projects in other
131
localities.” This standardized approach, however, led to disparities
within particular localities. Different parts of the New Orleans area,
for instance, are at higher risk from hurricanes than others. Because
suburban areas across the Mississippi River from New Orleans are
not at risk from Lake Pontchartrain, they face a 1 in 500 risk of
flooding from a storm surge in a given year, whereas the downtown
polder fronting the lake faced a 1 in 300 risk just prior to Hurricane
Katrina. Likewise, the areas in the two polders to the east of the
Industrial Canal, which were at risk from a storm surge flowing up the
MRGO Canal, faced an annual risk of between 1 in 200 (according to
the Corps analysis) and 1 in 100 (according to an analysis undertaken
by a former Corps engineer who is now a private consultant).
The Corps’ chief engineer for the New Orleans district, Al
Naomi, questions the Corps’ authority to take these varying risk
levels into account in planning for future storm protections. In his
view, Congress has mandated that all areas in the entire region be
protected from the same model storm. Thus, the levees in place
throughout the city prior to Hurricane Katrina were designed to
withstand a storm surge of 11.5 feet, ignoring the fact that some areas
in the region are likely to encounter storm surges of that magnitude
much more frequently than others. As we have discussed, the
Berkeley/ASCE study concluded that the storm surge along the
MRGO Canal exceeded the levees by as much as 10–15 feet, even
though the storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain did not overtop any
of the levees in the downtown polder.132 Building higher levees in the
areas that are, for geographical reasons, subject to more frequent

130. Id. at 12.
131. Id. at 1; see also id. at 2 (describing the SPH as being developed “to provide generalized
hurricane specifications that are consistent geographically and meteorologically for use in
planning, evaluating, and establishing hurricane design criteria for hurricane protection
works”).
132. See supra notes 75–85 and accompanying text.
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storm surges would, according to Naomi, violate the Corps’ legal
mandate. In his view, Congress would have to authorize such
variation specifically in legislation before the Corps could take it into
133
account in designing future levees.
Deciding how to define and implement equity concerns within
134
the natural disaster context is a daunting task. Should regulators
seek to equalize the probabilistic risk that individuals face, or the
amount of public money spent on protection per individual? To what
extent should the seemingly voluntary choices of individuals to live in
particularly vulnerable areas factor into the public policy assessment?
How should disaster planning take account of the socioeconomic
differences between, say, Trent Lott, whose historic oceanfront home
in Mississippi was destroyed by Katrina, and the thousands of
poverty-stricken New Orleans residents whose homes also were
known to be located in areas of great vulnerability?135 These are vital
moral and political questions that in Katrina’s aftermath receive little
attention from the Corps or from Congress, perhaps in part because
the SPH provides an unwarranted sense that relevant geographical
variations already have been accounted for.
Over time, moreover, the SPH seems to have acquired an even
stronger presumption of normativity, being described frequently in
Corps documents and other proceedings as the most severe storm
that the government “reasonably” or “practicably” should guard
against when designing hurricane protection projects. Thus, the SPH
came to represent not only a method for comparative assessment of
storm risks across geographic areas, but also a design standard that
carries its own implicit assurance of optimality:
• “The SPH is intended as a practicable expression of the
maximum degree of protection that should be sought as a

133. McQuaid, supra note 108.
134. Matthew D. Adler, Policy Analysis for Natural Hazards: Some Cautionary Lessons
from Environmental Policy Analysis, 56 DUKE L.J. 1, 7, 11–12, 29 (2006).
135. See Joe Johns, Sen. Lott’s Home Destroyed by Katrina, CNN.COM, Sept. 4, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/08/30/katrina.lott (last visited Oct. 1, 2006). A recurring
problem in natural disaster policy is that private insurance markets are ill-equipped to provide
ex ante risk-spreading services given the enormous degree of uncertainty and loss correlation
that characterize major catastrophes, while public officials are incapable of resisting the demand
for ex post disaster relief and compensation. See David A. Moss, Courting Disaster? The
Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy Since 1803, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE
RISK 307, 333–39 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999). Without a much stronger ex ante public role,
therefore, the country is likely to continue to experience a cycle of imprudent (or practically
involuntary) private decisionmaking followed by costly public bailout.
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general rule in the planning and design of coastal structures
for communities where protection of human life and
136
destruction of property is involved.”
• “An SPH is one that may be expected from the most severe
combination of meteorological conditions that are considered
137
reasonably characteristic of the region.”
• “The project has been designed to afford complete
protection from the occurrence of the largest probable storm
(SPH) that can reasonably be expected in the region. . . .
Probability of occurrence of hurricanes having a greater
magnitude than the SPH are too remote to warrant practical
consideration.”138
• “The project is designed to protect against the ‘standard
project hurricane’ moving on the most critical track. Only a
combination of hydrologic and meteorologic circumstances
anomalous to the region could produce higher stages. The
probability of such a combination occurring is, for all
practical purposes, nil.”139
• “[The SPH] was expected to have a frequency of occurrence
of once in about 200 years, and represented the most severe
combination of meteorological conditions considered
reasonably characteristic for the region.”140
• “To identify a level of risk a given area faces, we do
engineering and an economic analysis and come to an
141
optimum solution for a level of protection.”
By tracing the SPH back to its origins, however, one finds strong
basis for doubting the wisdom of this gradual normative reification of
the design standard. To begin with, the SPH is obviously only as
136.
137.

HYDROMETEOROLOGICAL BRANCH, supra note 125, at 3.
U.S. ARMY ENG’R DIST., LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN, LOUISIANA, AND VICINITY
HURRICANE PROTECTION PLAN I-2 (1974).
138. Id. at VIII-5.
139. Id. at VIII-11.
140. GAO REPORT, HURRICANE PROTECTION, supra note 16, at 4.
141. John McQuaid & Bill Walsh, Warnings to Beef up New Orleans’ ‘60s-Era Levees
Unheeded, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 2, 2005, available at http://www.newhousenews.
com/archive/mcquaid090205.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2006) (quoting Gen. Carl Strock, Army
Corps chief of engineers) (emphasis added). Statements such as these recall the claim of the
Corps’ Chief of Engineers in 1926—one year before the devastating Mississippi River flood that
remains one of the country’s worst-ever natural disasters—that the lower Mississippi River
levee system would “prevent the destructive effects of floods.” Moss, supra note 135, at 314
(internal citation omitted).

05__KYSAR_MCGARITY FINAL.DOC

218

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

11/14/2006 8:38 AM

[Vol. 56:179

reliable as the data it is built upon. The original SPH model, which
appeared in National Hurricane Research Program Report No. 33 in
1959, was built using data on all Atlantic tropical storms from 1900 to
1956 that reached hurricane intensity at some point during their
142
lifetimes. As the authors of the 1959 report acknowledged, much of
the data used was unreliable, given the great imprecision of the
available measurement technology. In particular, for much of the data
the researchers had to extrapolate from land-based measurements in
order to determine an estimate for off-shore storm pressure, because
it was not until later in the twentieth century that scientists began
using aircraft to measure storm pressure offshore.
Even assuming valid measurements, however, the fifty-seven143
year record was quite limited in scope—containing only twenty-two
storms in total for Zone B, the geographic area that included New
Orleans—and was obviously insufficient to generate a statistically
significant rendering of the overall distribution of potential storms
from a multi-century perspective.144 The researchers attempted to
extrapolate from the existing data by, first, calculating the cumulative
number of storms that had appeared during the observation period at
or below various levels of pressure (see Figure 3). This measure was
then converted to a 100-year index simply by linearly stretching the
data out from fifty-six to one hundred years. Finally, the data were
plotted on normal distribution graph paper with the idea that, if the
observed data appeared to fall into a straight line, then one could
conclude that hurricane frequency follows a normal distribution and,
therefore, that extrapolationg to longer return periods could be
accomplished simply by following the observed trend line (see Figure
4).

142. GRAHAM & NUNN, supra note 126, at 3.
143. Id. at 1.
144. See HYDROMETEOROLOGICAL BRANCH, supra note 125, at 3–4 (“Because of the
manner in which the statistics of the [Central Pressure Index] were developed the 100-year CPI
at any point on the Atlantic coast, say x, must be interpreted as the CPI value which may be
expected to occur once in 100 years, on the average, at some point in a 300 n. mi. zone centered
at x.” (internal citation omitted)). Even with respect to the data that were available, one of the
more severe storms in the geographic zone containing New Orleans was listed in the table, but a
footnote disclosed that the storm was not used in the construction of the SPH because the
frequency index had already been calculated by the time the storm occurred.
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Figure 3. Cumulative Number of Storms in Zone B at Various
Pressure Levels

Figure 4. Cumulative Number of Storms in Zone B at Various
Pressure Levels, Converted to 100-Year Index
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There may be reason to doubt these assumptions. Looking at
Zone A—which included Florida and areas east of New Orleans (see
Figure 5)—one observes that, in addition to the much sharper slope
of the pressure data, at least one recorded storm lies far outside the
normal distribution trend. Of course, that is just one storm and it is
very difficult to say whether it represents a one hundred, five
hundred, or ten thousand year storm. But that is precisely the point:
with such a small sample, there is really not much that empirically
supports the assumption that storm intensity will follow a normal
distribution. Instead, the decision to extrapolate linearly is one that
depended on a relatively unexamined conviction that Gulf storm
behavior follows the tidy world of classical mathematics. It may well,
of course, but it may also represent what Professor Dan Farber has
called the world of “probabilities behaving badly,” a world in which
complex, adaptive systems are characterized not by normal
probability distributions, but by power law distributions in which
extreme events appear with a surprising regularity.145
Figure 5. Cumulative Number of Storms in Zone A at Various
Pressure Levels, Converted to 100-Year Index

145. Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental
Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 152–55 (2003).
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Along those lines, consider a few facts from the 2005 Atlantic
hurricane season:
• Twenty-seven Atlantic storms were named during 2005, the
most on record, shattering the previous record of twenty-one
from 1933. For the first time, meteorologists had to reach
into the Greek alphabet for additional storm names.
• Fifteen hurricanes were observed, breaking the old record of
twelve set in 1969.
• 2005 saw the most Category Five storms ever recorded in one
season in the Atlantic basin (Katrina, Rita, and Wilma).
• Wilma became the strongest hurricane on record in the
Atlantic basin, as measured by barometric pressure. Three of
the six strongest hurricanes on record occurred in 2005.
• Hurricane Katrina made landfall with wind speeds of 125
mph and a minimum central pressure of 27.13 inches, the
third lowest on record at landfall behind Hurricane Camille
from 1969 and the Labor Day Hurricane that struck the
146
Florida Keys in 1935.
• Katrina was the costliest U.S. hurricane on record. In
addition, the overall season tally for damage was the costliest
in U.S. history.
• Hurricane Vince became the first known instance of a
tropical cyclone making landfall in Spain.
• Hurricane Delta became only the sixth hurricane on record
in December since 1851.
• Tropical cyclone Zeta became the longest-lived tropical
cyclone ever recorded in January.
These data are, of course, merely suggestive, but they highlight
the critical question facing disaster planners of whether the classical
scientific assumption of normal distributions and predictable, linear
biophysical behavior is appropriate in a world of complexity and
climate change.147 Even putting aside these problems of model
uncertainty, however, one still faces the basic decision of how

146. See also GAO REPORT, HURRICANE PROTECTION, supra note 16, at 5 (reporting that
at landfall Katrina had a central barometric pressure of 27.17 inches and a windspeed of 140
mph).
147. One engineer who examined the New Orleans levee system in 2002 concluded that
“risks may be significantly higher than the [C]orps maintains—perhaps double—on the east side
along levees protecting eastern New Orleans, the Lower 9th Ward, Arabi and Chalmette.”
McQuaid & Schleifstein, supra note 18 (quoting engineering consultant Lee Butler).
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conservative to be in setting the benchmark for the SPH. The 1959
researchers focused on central barometric pressure and constructed a
table reflecting the lowest central pressure index that one would
expect at various geographic locations with an annual probability of 1
percent. In other words, they chose the 100-year return period for
central pressure, as estimated using their admittedly limited data
sample and their contestable extrapolation technique. Figure 6 shows
the resulting values at various geographic locations throughout the
Gulf. For New Orleans, the 100-year estimate was 27.60 inches.
Again, the SPH was not equivalent to a 100-year storm, because
central pressure was then interpolated with other variables in a way
that tended to make the SPH more severe at any given point than a
100-year storm. How much more, however, is hard to say because the
SPH depends on location-specific combinations of these variables.
That is why the New Orleans levee system was frequently described
as having been designed to guard against something like a 200- to 300year storm.
Figure 6. Geographic Variation of Average Frequency per 100 Years
of Hurricane Central Pressure Index, Zones A, B, and C
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Still, why anchor on a 100-year central pressure index, rather
than 500 or 10,000 years? As the Corps noted in its 1972 revision of
the SPH, this decision to hinge determination of the SPH on a 100year central pressure index return period was essentially an
“arbitrary” one when considered from the scientific perspective.148
This is not to say that the original analysts were unjustified in
choosing a 100-year return period for central pressure or that some
other period was obviously more appropriate. It is simply to say that
149
the question was not a purely technical one. One can find clues as to
those nontechnical considerations in contemporaneous descriptions
of the SPH model, where commentators describe the model as being
used to project the worst storm that is “economically [] justified” to
guard against.150 In fact, some Corps economists at the time believed
that the SPH was too cautious, and that a less severe storm should be
used as the benchmark for disaster planning and prevention.
This murky blending of science and policy continued in the much
more elaborate and technical 1979 overhaul of the SPH. In this
report, the SPH was changed so that the critical pressure parameter
was derived not from the 100-year lowest expected pressure, but from
the average of the seven lowest actually observed storms (see Figure
7).

148. HYDROMETEOROLOGICAL BRANCH, supra note 125, at 3.
149. Even on narrow economic grounds, the choice of a 100-year return period for natural
disaster planning might be questioned: Studies suggest, for instance, that a large majority (66
percent to 83 percent) of losses from floods and hurricane winds come from events with
recurrence intervals less frequent than the 100-year flood. See Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane
Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster Policy: Bringing about Wise Governmental
Decisions for Hazardous Areas, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Mar. 2006, at 171, 177.
Again, though, it bears noting that the SPH does not strictly speaking represent a 100-year
storm. See supra notes 121–30 and accompanying text.
150. Perdikis, supra note 121, at 9.
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Figure 7. Critical Pressure Derived from Average of Seven Lowest
Actually Observed Storms

This procedure may seem to be an improvement over the
arbitrary selection of a 100-year low, but it still leaves unanswered the
question, why not take the lowest five storms, or the single lowest
storm, or even the single lowest storm with an additional safety
margin included? In fact, the researchers did something quite the
opposite in that they excluded the two worst observed storms from
their seven lowest storm index: Hurricane Camille from 1969, and the
Labor Day storm of 1935. The reasons provided for this exclusion are
somewhat obscure in the report: “Our decision was based on the idea
that these two hurricanes contained extremely low po’s resulting in
sustained wind speeds that were not reasonably characteristic of the
151
northern gulf coast and the Florida Keys.”

151. RICHARD W. SCHWERDT ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NOAA
TECHNICAL REPORT NWS 23, METEOROLOGICAL CRITERIA FOR STANDARD PROJECT
HURRICANE AND PROBABLE MAXIMUM HURRICANE WIND FIELDS, GULF AND EAST COASTS
OF THE UNITED STATES 143 (1979); see also id. (“These two hurricanes are much more severe
than any other in the gulf and are therefore not ‘reasonably characteristic.’”); id. at 2 (“By
reasonably characteristic is meant that only a few hurricanes of record over a large region have
had more extreme values of the meteorological parameters.”).
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To be sure, excluding outlier data is standard practice for much
statistical analysis, yet the move seems inappropriate in the context of
natural disaster planning. The extreme tails of a distribution in this
152
context may be precisely the areas of most interest and concern.
After all, the two storms excluded—Camille and the Labor Day
storm—were the only two on record with a lower central pressure
than Katrina. The subjective nature of the data-trimming judgment is
implicitly acknowledged elsewhere in the technical report, when the
analysts recommend use of an alternative, much more conservative
measure—the probable maximum hurricane—for disaster planning
“in locations where high winds, waves and storm surge could pose a
threat to the public health and safety from a hurricane-induced
accident at a nuclear power plant.”153 Why not use this higher
standard of protection for projects that do not involve nuclear power
plants? As one observer noted, “[t]he design of structures to provide
protection against the probable maximum hurricane would, in most
locations, be economically unjustified.”154 Thus, loaded into the SPH
model again is an implicit cost-benefit calculation, one that prevents
policymakers from asking directly whether an extreme event is worth
guarding against simply by excluding the possibility that such an event
will occur.
Marshalling support for current public investment in long-term
disaster prevention and mitigation projects is a political challenge of
the highest magnitude. As Professor Kenneth Boulding once wryly
noted, “It seems to be very hard to organize a long-run crisis.”155
Given this difficulty, one advantage of the conventional return period
approach to describing flood and storm protection projects is its ready
accessibility to nonexpert audiences.156 For instance, when the Dutch

152. Farber, supra note 145, at 155.
153. SCHWERDT ET AL., supra note 151, at 5.
154. Perdikis, supra note 121, at 9. The new conservative approach of taking seven of the
lowest storms on record did result in a further revision downward of the New Orleans SPH
central pressure measure, from 27.36 to 27.30. Nevertheless, Katrina made landfall with a
pressure of 27.13 inches—an intensity that was clearly foreseeable to the designers of the SPH
model, as a comparison of the SPH and the Probable Maximum Hurricane estimates for New
Orleans demonstrates.
155. Kenneth E. Boulding, Spaceship Earth Revisited, in VALUING THE EARTH:
ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETHICS 311, 311 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. Townsend eds.,
1993).
156. As cognitive psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer has shown, individuals appear to process
risk information much more reliably when it is presented in frequency rather than probability
terms. See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer, The Bounded Rationality of Probabilistic Mental Models, in
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suffered a devastating storm in 1953 that killed two thousand people,
the nation embarked on a thirty-year plan to protect the country
against the worst storm that could be expected in ten thousand
157
years. Similarly, when a massive Mississippi River flood in 1927
killed several hundred individuals, displaced over five hundred
thousand, and destroyed property worth some $3 billion (in 1993
158
dollars), Congress and the Corps developed an especially robust
Mississippi River flood protection system that was designed to
withstand an 800-year flood, some five hundred years more forwardlooking than the LPVHPP.159 By most reports, the Mississippi River
system performed extremely well during Hurricane Katrina despite
storm surges that reached 15 to 20 feet along river stretches below
160
New Orleans.
Did the relative opacity of the SPH prevent the development of
political support for a more robust hurricane protection system along
the lines of the Mississippi River system? Almost certainly not. As the
GAO reported in 1982, state and local sponsors in New Orleans
repeatedly “recommended that the Corps lower its design standards
to provide more realistic hurricane protection to withstand a
hurricane whose intensity might occur once every 100 years rather
than building a project to withstand a once in 200- to 300-year
161
Still, over time, more widely comprehensible
occurrence.”
protection standards might help to overcome the apparent reluctance
of political constituencies to support long-term, intergenerational
disaster planning. As of 2006, the Association of State Floodplain
Managers advocates a 500-year storm level of protection for urban

RATIONALITY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 284 (K.I. Manktelow &
D.E. Over eds., 1993); Gerd Gigerenzer, Ecological Intelligence: An Adaptation for Frequencies,
in THE EVOLUTION OF MIND 9, 11–15 (Denise Dellarosa Cummins & Colin Allen eds., 1998);
Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage, How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning Without Instruction:
Frequency Formats, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 684, 697–98 (1995); Gerd Gigerenzer, How to Make
Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond “Heuristics and Biases,” 2 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 83
(1991).
157. Moore, supra note 74.
158. Moss, supra note 135, at 308.
159. As one expert put it: “The city is exposed to as much as four times the risk of hurricane
flooding as it is to river flooding. . . . That’s always been an odd issue to me. Why would the
government think that water from the lake is less dangerous than water from the river[?]”
McQuaid & Schleifstein, supra note 18 (quoting Louisiana State University engineering
professor, Joseph Suhayda).
160. Marshall, supra note 7.
161. 1982 GAO REPORT, supra note 37, app. I at 9 (emphasis added).
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162
areas and critical facilities. The wisdom of such a standard depends
in part on technical engineering and economic factors, but it also
depends critically on the public’s attitude toward risk, uncertainty,
and intergenerational obligation. Rather than highlight such concerns
for public scrutiny and deliberation, the SPH seems to have buried
them within a confidently expressed, but ultimately illusory assurance
of “reasonableness” and “optimality.”

B. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Since the Flood Control Act of 1936, Army Corps of Engineers
project funding has been limited by Congress to those projects that
have demonstrated benefits in excess of costs.163 This early form of
regulatory cost-benefit analysis was not originally associated with a
perceived need for agency discipline, as it is today, but rather with a
conviction that science, empiricism, and expert judgment could lead
to wise policymaking.164 Over time, such New Deal optimism became
replaced by a more skeptical view of government, and the Army
Corps in particular seemed to attract scrutiny from interests all along
the political spectrum who began to view the statutory cost-benefit
requirement as a valuable check on the otherwise overreaching
impulses of the Corps. In part for reasons such as this, a number of
prominent scholars and officials today regard the use of formal costbenefit analysis to be of critical importance to the future of
environmental, health, and safety regulation.165
The history of the LPVHPP planning process, however, suggests
that the cost-benefit requirement may have had undesirable

162. ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, supra note 1, at 4.
163. Flood Control Act of 1936, ch. 688, § 1, 49 Stat. 1570, 1570 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. § 701(a) (2000)).
164. See THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN
SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE 148–89 (1995).
165. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 139 (2004); CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION, at ix
(2002); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 129–48
(2005); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, at ix
(2002); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J.
165, 168 (1999); Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in
Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCI. 221, 222 (1996); Kenneth J. Arrow &
Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions, 60 AM. ECON.
REV. 364, 366–67 (1970); Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification and
Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1157 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein,
Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1060 (2000).
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distortionary effects on Corps decisionmaking. A report in the
Washington Post, for instance, claimed that the critical normative
judgments described in the previous Section regarding the
construction of the SPH were driven in part by concern that the costbenefit constraint facing Corps’ projects would not justify higher
levels of storm protection.166 In fact, an Army Corps official in 1978
reported that economic cost-benefit analyses at the time were
167
prescribing an even lower level of protection than the SPH. No
doubt these economic conclusions were driven in part by the standard
use of a 3.25 percent discount rate in evaluating monetized projects’
costs and benefits,168 a procedure that scholars have shown to reflect a
clumsy and inadequate way of addressing questions of
intergenerational equity, particularly in the face of very long-range
planning of the sort implicated by disaster policy.169

166. The article states:
The Corps was required to recommend the project with the most economic benefits—
no matter who received them—compared to the cost to taxpayers. It could not
consider whether the benefits would be fairly distributed, or the value of wetlands the
projects might destroy, or even the value of protecting people from death. So the
Corps settled on 200-year protection from storms, a sharp contrast to the 800-year
protection from the river.
Michael Grunwald & Susan B. Glasser, The Slow Drowning of New Orleans, WASH. POST, Oct.
9, 2005, at A1.
167. 1978 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 16 (testimony of Colonel Early J. Rush III,
District Engineer, U.S. Army Engineer District, New Orleans) (“Even though economists may,
and in this case, did, favor protection to a lower scale to produce a higher ratio of project
benefits to project costs, the threat of loss of human life mandated using the standard project
hurricane.”); see also SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR
AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 89–90 (2006) (quoting
Col. Early Rush, Corps District Commander for New Orleans, testifying at a 1978 hearing).
168. See U.S. ARMY ENG’R DIST., supra note 137, at VIII-12.
169. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 179–80 (2004); Frank Ackerman & Lisa
Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 1553, 1563 (2002); Tyler Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in
JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 144, 144–61 (Peter Laslett & James S.
Fishkin eds., 1992); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE L.J. 1911, 1911 (1999); Lisa
Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39, 40–41 (1999); Lisa
Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025, 2027–28 (1999); Lisa
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2068–69 (1998);
Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 580–85 (2004); Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and
Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 728–29 (2003); Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution,
and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 28–36 (2001); Richard B. Norgaard
& Richard B. Howarth, Sustainability and Discounting the Future, in ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS:
THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY 88, 97–98 (Robert Costanza ed., 1991).
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It also bears noting that the Corps typically does not take
potential loss of life into account when conducting cost-benefit
analyses of its projects. According to the GAO, the Corps’ guidance
(Engineer Regulation 1105-2-100) directs analysts to address the issue
of prevention of loss of life when evaluating alternative plans, but
they are not required to formally estimate the number of lives saved
170
or lost as a potential effect of a project. In situations where
historical data exist, the analysts have the option to estimate the
number of persons potentially affected by a project and include this
number as an additional factor for the consideration of
decisionmakers. Hence, a high cost project that has few economic
benefits, but which would save many lives, may not pass the costbenefit test because the Corps does not include the lives saved as an
explicitly monetized benefit.
In practice, this exclusion of saved human lives from cost-benefit
calculation may have contributed to the Corps’ apparent practice of
liberally including prospects for private development as part of its
flood control and hurricane protection projects. Because the Corps
did not include saved human lives or ecological values in its costbenefit analyses, the bulk of the identified benefit from hurricane
protection tended to come from the safeguarding of real and personal
property.171 Thus, in order to generate a higher regulatory “budget”
for project planning purposes, the Corps seems naturally to have been
tempted to design projects in ways that generated easily identifiable
and monetizable property protection benefits, even if that meant the
earmarking of wetlands for future development that might otherwise
have remained in their natural, storm surge-dampening state.172
Indeed, a key aspect of the local opposition to the LPVHPP centered
on the question of whether the Corps had gone beyond protecting
existing and anticipated land developments to actively promoting new
170. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CORPS OF ENGINEERS: IMPROVED ANALYSIS
COSTS AND BENEFITS NEEDED FOR SACRAMENTO FLOOD PROTECTION PROJECT 20 n.13
(2003).
171. See U.S. ARMY ENG’R DIST., supra note 137, at title page (reporting only property
damage prevention, land intensification, and redevelopment as itemized annual benefits); id. at
VIII-21 (“Environmental losses were not evaluated in dollar terms.”).
172. See id. at ii (“Indirectly, the plan will hasten urbanization and industrialization of
valuable marshes and swamps by providing for further flood protection and land reclamation.”);
see also id. at VIII-27 (“Several areas would be rendered more suitable for urban use as a result
of the project works. This effect will be reflected in increases in value of these lands, which
increases are called ‘enhancement benefits,’ since they do represent additions to the Gross
National Product.”).

OF
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development that would not have occurred but for the Corps’
activities. As one analyst noted, “[a]n extraordinary 79% [of the net
benefits from the LPVHPP] were to come from new development
that would now be feasible with the added protection provided by the
173
improved levee system.”
The use of cost-benefit analysis for purposes of environmental,
health, and safety regulation is, of course, highly controversial and a
full treatment of the subject is well beyond the scope of this Article.
Even if the Corps had included human health and environmental
values within its cost-benefit calculations, theoretically and
normatively difficult questions would have remained regarding how
to monetize those values and how to account for their intertemporal
174
distribution. What the Katrina planning process more narrowly
seems to show, however, is yet another way in which cost-benefit
analysis in practice leads to the very kinds of political and analytical
distortions that the procedure is designed to guard against. For
example, some observers of the regulatory process (including one of
the authors of this Article) have advocated greater use of
retrospective cost analysis as a check on what appear to be systematic
overestimates of industry regulatory compliance costs in prospective
cost-benefit analysis—a distortion that leads to unduly modest levels
of investment in environmental, health, and safety regulation.175
Similarly, in the Katrina context, the failure to account adequately for

173. Burby, supra note 149, at 174 (citing 1976 GAO REPORT, supra note 20). This
conflation of protection and promotion purposes appears to be common within flood control
and hurricane protection planning. See RAYMOND J. BURBY & STEVEN P. FRENCH, FLOOD
PLAIN LAND USE MANAGEMENT: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 146–47 (1985) (finding a positive
correlation between community flood controls works and the amount of new development
taking place in flood hazard areas after flood control works are completed).
174. See supra note 169.
175. Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety and
Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 1998–2000 (2002); see also OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE,
LOCAL AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 41–52 (2005) (using retrospective estimates to validate costbenefit projections prepared prior to regulation). Of course, to the extent that hindsight analysis
of regulatory costs involves speculation about how regulated entities would have addressed the
hazards of the regulated activity in the absence of the regulatory intervention (e.g., to avoid
potential tort liability), the value of retrospective cost assessments may prove illusory. It should
be noted, however, that many regulatory interventions address environmental hazards, the costs
of which are relatively easily externalized, and health hazards, the costs of which are unevenly
internalized by tort law. In these situations, the assumption that the regulated entities would
have taken little or no action to address such hazards may yield a fairly accurate regulatory cost
assessment.
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the lifesaving purposes of hurricane protection seems to have led the
Corps not only to understate the monetary justification for hurricane
protection, but also to promote private land development schemes
that may well have been counterproductive from the perspective of
guarding against storm surges.
C. Priority Setting
The Corps is very reluctant to participate in the process of setting
priorities for its projects. Once the Corps has determined that the
benefits of a proposed project exceed its costs, the Corps leaves it to
Congress to decide through the appropriations process those projects
176
that receive funding and those that do not. The Corps’ reluctance in
this regard is somewhat understandable, given the agency’s desire to
appear to be a politically neutral, expert-driven body, rather than the
self-aggrandizing pork processor it often is depicted to be in more
cynical political discussion.177 Yet the Corps’ relative agnosticism on
priorities deprives congressional decisionmakers of crucial contextual
information regarding the relative seriousness of proposed projects.
As one observer noted, “[s]aving New Orleans gets no more emphasis
than draining wetlands to grow corn and soybeans.”178
The Corps’ agnosticism in this regard also encourages piecemeal,
project-by-project congressional decisionmaking, when a more
comprehensive approach is required that integrates flood control,
hurricane protection, coastal restoration, ecosystem preservation, and
mitigation projects within a single framework. The much-criticized
MRGO Canal, for instance, might have appeared to be a far less
attractive project had it been analyzed as part of a more direct and
inclusive effort to balance economic development with human safety
and the environment. As Professor Oliver Houck has noted, the
MRGO costs taxpayers thousands of dollars per ship passing while it
has destroyed 26,000 acres of cypress hardwood and marsh. As a
result, “environmentalists have been trying to get [it] closed for 25

176. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, Money Flowed to Questionable Projects, WASH. POST,
Sept. 8, 2005, at A1 (observing that, “more than any other federal agency, the Corps is
controlled by Congress; its $4.7 billion civil works budget consists almost entirely of ‘earmarks’
inserted by individual legislators”).
177. See, e.g., id. (“Despite a series of independent investigations criticizing Army Corps
construction projects as wasteful pork-barrel spending, Louisiana’s representatives have kept
bringing home the bacon.”).
178. Id. (quoting Tim Searchinger, a senior attorney at Environmental Defense).
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years.” Thus, for a variety of reasons beyond just its potentially riskenhancing qualities with respect to hurricanes, the MRGO seems to
represent indefensible public policy. The full egregiousness of the
project, however, is difficult to perceive when its implications are
analyzed only in a piecemeal fashion.
Moreover, the polder containing the Ninth Ward and parts of St.
Bernard Parish that flooded during Hurricane Katrina also was
inundated in 1965 during Hurricane Betsy, a fast-moving Category
Three hurricane. Officials at the time suggested that the MRGO
Canal had acted like a funnel, channeling the storm surge from the
180
Gulf of Mexico into New Orleans. A Times-Picayune article in 2002
later noted that “[p]roponents of closing and filling in MRGO say it
has evolved into a shotgun pointed straight at New Orleans, should a
major hurricane approach from that angle.”181 Levee analysis and
sophisticated modeling exercises have led some experts to conclude
that this very shotgun fired during Hurricane Katrina, with
devastating results.182 Although it is certainly possible that the polder
would have flooded even if the MRGO Canal had not existed in 1965
and again in 2005, policymakers could reasonably conclude that filling
in the MRGO Canal now would eliminate a potential cause of future
183
flooding.
In order to appreciate these multidimensional implications of the
MRGO Canal, one must move beyond narrowly framed modes of
policy analysis and embrace something more like the emerging
sustainable development paradigm, in which the many determinants

179. See, e.g., Recovering from Katrina and Rita: Environmental Governance Lessons
Learned and Applied, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,139, 10,150 (2006) (statement of Oliver Houck).
180. Karen Turni, Upgrade of Levees Proposed by Corps, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 12, 1998,
at A1.
181. McQuaid & Schleifstein, supra note 18.
182. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
183. See Levees Washed Away Along MRGO and St. Bernard Parish, Army Corps Say,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.nola.com/weblogs/print.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_TimesPicayune/archives/print079451.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2006) (“If we didn’t have Mr. Go, we
would have had some problems, but we wouldn’t have had 30,000 homes flooded.” (quoting
State Senator Walter Boasso)); John Schwartz & Andrew C. Revkin, Levee Reconstruction Will
Restore, but Not Improve, Defenses in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at A22 (quoting
Dr. Craig E. Colten of Louisiana State University, who advocates shutting down the MRGO
Canal). In 1998, the St. Bernard parish Council unanimously passed a resolution demanding that
the MRGO be closed. Grunwald, supra note 75. The Corps of Engineers has stopped dredging
the MRGO Canal, and it may recommend that it be shut down. John McQuaid et al., Protecting
the Area from Another Major Storm is Crucial to Getting New Orleans Back on Its Feet . . . But
How?, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 25, 2005, at 1.

05__KYSAR_MCGARITY FINAL.DOC

2006]

11/14/2006 8:38 AM

DID NEPA DROWN NEW ORLEANS?

233

of human well-being and environmental sustainability are treated as
184
aspects of a single complex, but integrated public policy framework.
It makes little sense, for instance, to talk about the optimal postKatrina hurricane protection plan for New Orleans without also
discussing wetlands, housing and transportation, climate change and
energy, and a host of other policy areas that undoubtedly and
significantly will impact the very parameters that also guide hurricane
protection planning. Such decisionmaking will not lend itself to
formulaic resolution. Accordingly, it is by nature pluralistic and
messy. Yet it also appears to be the most reliable way that disasters
such as Katrina can be anticipated and avoided in an increasingly
intertwined and fragile world.
CONCLUSION
Familiar aphorisms aside, hindsight is not necessarily 20/20: The
counterfactual nature of the hindsight causation analysis inevitably
requires the analyst to create a hypothetical world in which
alternatives are chosen that were not in fact adopted in the real
world. As with the related “cause-in-fact” inquiry in tort law, this
inquiry invites a great deal of speculation. When the suggested cause
of a catastrophic failure is remote in time and when many other
actions that are also relevant to the causal analysis intervene or could
have intervened between the suggested cause and the failure, the
opportunity for analysts to speculate—or manipulate—becomes very
real. Accordingly, how we sort among many uncertain counterfactual
worlds to identify responsible causal agents says as much about our
politics and our culture as it does about our science.185
In that respect, attempts by politicians and pundits in Katrina’s
aftermath to pin the levee failure in New Orleans on NEPA litigation
do not speak well of our politics and our culture. Hindsight analysis
provides little reason to believe that a barrier project of the sort
envisioned in 1976 would have prevented the Hurricane Katrina
storm surge from breaching the levees along the 17th Street and
London Avenue canals, as critics of NEPA have argued. Looking

184. See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83
TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2113–14 (2005) (advocating a reexamined sustainable development
paradigm).
185. Cf. Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1803
(2003) (describing the manner in which the perception of risk and the attribution of blame are
freighted with cultural meaning).
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forward, policymakers are well advised to examine what exactly
caused the levees along the outfall canals to fail, taking action to
rebuild or fortify those levees prior to investing in an expensive
barrier project. Once that remedial work is accomplished, a more
expansive barrier project may still be warranted, and it may even
need to be substantially more protective than the project envisioned
in 1976, including a seagate at the point at which the MRGO Canal
intersects with the Intercoastal Waterway to provide equitable levels
of protection to New Orleans East and St. Bernard Parish.186 Any such
project, however, should only be contemplated with the same
commitment to integrated, environmentally-informed decisionmaking
that has characterized NEPA since its adoption in 1969.
According to some estimates, a coastal protection system capable
of guarding against a Category Four to Five storm for New Orleans
would cost $2.5 billion and require ten to twenty years of
construction.187 As hindsight analysis of the LPVHPP planning
process shows, deciding whether to undertake such a project can
never be reduced entirely to a technocratic exercise. Just as judgment
and discretion inhere in the attribution of fault for a causally
overdetermined disaster, so too does the prediction of harm from
inherently complex and uncertain systems always require the exercise
of collective agency and responsibility. To be sure, the tools of risk
assessment and cost-benefit analysis do provide vital information for
public policymaking. They must, however, be deployed with a degree
of sensitivity regarding their limitations and a vigilant awareness of
the need for moral and political judgments that go beyond the
parameters of the formalized analytical frameworks.
The LPVHPP planning process suggests that such sensitivity and
awareness may have been placed in jeopardy by overzealous
188
confidence in the powers of technical decisionmaking apparatuses.

186.
187.

McQuaid et al., supra note 183.
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NEW ORLEANS LEVEES AND FLOODWALLS: HURRICANE
DAMAGE PROTECTION 6 (2005). These estimates are likely vastly optimistic. See Peter
Whoriskey & Spencer S. Shu, Levee Repair Costs Triple, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2006, at A1
(noting that the Bush administration had raised cost estimates for rebuilding the New Orleans
levee system to “federal standards” to $10 billion in light of better understanding of wetlands
loss, subsidence, and hurricane frequency and intensity).
188. PORTER, supra note 164, at 8 (“[Q]uantitative estimates sometimes are given
considerable weight even when nobody defends their validity with real conviction. . . .
Quantification is a way of making decisions without seeming to decide. Objectivity lends
authority to officials who have very little of their own.”).
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In the case of the SPH, a sophisticated meteorological model tended
to obscure important decisions regarding the treatment of highly
uncertain but potentially catastrophic risks to present and future New
Orleans residents, suggesting a degree of normative agreement
lurking behind the concept of “reasonably characteristic” hurricanes
that was almost certainly absent in actuality. In the case of costbenefit analysis, the Corps’ approach to economic project evaluation
seemed both to stack the deck against long-range investment in
disaster prevention and mitigation, and to promote a form of
“mission creep” in the Corps planning activities toward easily
monetizable benefits.
In sum, neither the blame game nor the numbers game is up to
the task of formulating sound and ethical natural disaster policy.
Instead, analysts should set out the uncertainties of both hindsight
and prospective analyses in a way that is easily accessible to
decisionmakers and the public, so that the full challenge of long-term
intergenerational risk regulation will be highlighted for consideration,
rather than obscured from view. Focusing narrowly on any single
parameter of complex natural and human systems is likely to
dramatically
distort
environmental,
health,
and
safety
decisionmaking—whether the parameter is a “standard project
hurricane” when planning a hurricane protection plan, or the equally
mythical “lawsuit that sunk New Orleans” when attempting to
allocate responsibility for a disaster some forty years later.

